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ABSTRACT 
This study on terrorism training follows the logic that terrorism is a “wicked 
problem” and there are various strategies to cope with it. Systems thinking is one of the 
coping strategies to address “wicked problems.” A system is a whole composed of 
complex organized elements (subsystems) interacting with each other and with their 
environment. The stability of a system depends on its components’ alignment. 
Misaligning one of its components, will destabilize, or even disrupt the whole system. In 
this regard, the study defines terrorism and terrorist organizations in systems terms, 
explains their components and interrelations, and concludes that the most important 
component of a terrorist system is the training subsystem. Thus it is important to 
understand how the subsystem functions in order to disrupt the whole system.  
The study reviews the types of terrorist training, how the terrorists and their 
organizations learn (process), what the terrorists learn (content), where the terrorists learn 
(location) and concludes that the internet is the new safe haven for terrorist training. It 
also demonstrates the adaptive capability of terrorist system moving from land-based to 
internet-based training. Almost every terrorist organization on the U.S. Sate 
Department’s designated terrorist organizations list exists on the Net. One example is the 
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) terrorist network.  Its website network is analyzed by 
content and network structure using social network analysis software UCINET. The goal 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study on the terrorism training will follow logic that terrorism is a “wicked 
problem” and there are various strategies to cope with it. Systems thinking is one of the 
coping strategies. A system is a whole composed of complex organized elements (sub 
systems) interacting with each other and with their environment. The stability of a system 
depends on its components’ alignment. If we misalign one of its components, we can 
destabilize even disrupt the whole system. Thus, the structure of the study is as follows: 
Chapter I explains why terrorism is a wicked problem by demonstrating that 
terrorism has all the basic characteristics of wicked problems. Chapter I also provides an 
overview of the coping strategies of “wicked problems” and chooses a systems approach 
to deal with the wicked problem of terrorism. 
Chapter II defines terrorism and terrorist organizations in systems terms, explains 
its components and interrelations among these components, and concludes that the most 
important component of the system is the training subsystem. Thus, our goal is to 
understand how the terrorist training subsystem functions. 
Chapter III focuses on the training subsystem, identifies the types of terrorist 
training, how the terrorists and their organizations learn (process), what the terrorists 
learn (content) and where the terrorists learn (location). It concludes that internet is the 
new safe haven for terrorist training demonstrating the adaptive capability of terrorist 
system moving from land-based to the Internet based-training. 
Chapter IV explains how terrorists use the internet, especially in their training 
activities. It concludes that almost all the attention of counterterrorism efforts to counter 
terrorists on the net concentrate on the web-based use of internet. However, new 
technologies, introduced with the broadband internet, enable peer-to-peer connection. 
Thus, a more decentralized nature of peer-to-peer networks, which appears to be the new 
trend among terrorist networks, will make monitoring the communications in terrorist 
systems more difficult. 
Chapter V examines how a terrorist system uses the internet, especially for 
motivational training of its current and prospected militants. Using social network 
 xvi
analysis, it analyzes the website network of PKK, a terrorist organization on United 
States’ and European Union’s designated terrorist organizations list. 
Chapter VI concludes the study and gives some policy implications for coping 
with the wicked problem of terrorism.  
 
 




Some Hindus had brought an elephant for exhibition and placed it in a 
dark house. Crowds of people were going into that dark place to see the 
beast. Finding that ocular inspection was impossible, each visitor felt it 
with his palm in the darkness. The palm of one fell on the trunk ‘This 
creature is like a water-spout,’ he said. The hand of another lighted on the 
elephant’s ear. To him the beast was evidently like a fan. Another rubbed 
against its leg.  ‘I found the elephant’s shape is like a pillar,’ he said. 
Another laid his hand on its back. ‘Certainly this elephant was like a 
throne,’ he said.1  
                                                                                                               Rumi 1207-1273 
 
Almost no day passes without terror-related news published in the visual or 
printed media, be it a bloody plot, a threat, or a communiqué. Terror has infiltrated our 
daily life with the thorough inspections of our baggage at the airports, debates about 
monitoring our daily e-mail traffic, or discussions about the possibility of mushroom 
clouds over major cosmopolitan cities. People are the victims of bomb blasts in 
commuter trains, in public buses, in shopping malls or even at children’s parks2, in some 
countries which are more susceptible to terrorism. 
Scientists have been trying to explain terrorism for a long time, and after 9/11, 
these studies proliferated due to the importance of the subject as well as interest among 
people all over the world who witness the change of its scope in terms of lethality and the 
ongoing global war on terrorism. 
A. DEFINING TERRORISM: AN ELEPHANT IN THE DARKNESS  
Terrorism is not an easy subject to conceptualize, and debates on the definition of 
terrorism are the indicator of this hardship. Terrorism expert Alex Schmid gives five 
frameworks to view terrorism: “terrorism as a crime,” “terrorism as warfare,” “terrorism 
as political violence,” “terrorism as religious zealotry,” and “terrorism as 
                                                 
1 Jalal al-Din Rumi  translated by A.J. Arberry, “Tales from Masnavi,”  available at 
http://www.khamush.com/tales_from_masnavi.htm#The%20Elephant accessed on 16 September 2006 
2 “Bomb Blast kill seven, wounds 17 in Turkey,” Reuters, 12 September 2006, available at 
http://go.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=13467062&src=rss/worldNews 
2 
communication.”3 These frameworks are also the lenses through which people define the 
problem. The way that states, organizations or integrated structures like United Nations 
define terrorism, and the concepts related to it, demonstrates how they perceive the threat 
and what measures they should take to defeat it. For example, Article 1 of the 1991 Anti-
Terror Law of Turkey defines terrorism as:  
Any act committed by an individual or individuals belonging to an 
organization with a view to change the constitutionally determined 
characteristics of the Republic and the political, legal, social, secular and 
economic order through oppression, violence, intimidation or threat; to 
destroy the indivisible territorial and national integrity of the State or to 
endanger the existence of the Turkish State and Republic; to weaken or 
take over the state authority; to suppress the fundamental rights and 
freedoms; to disrupt the domestic or external security as well as public 
order and health, is an act of terror.4 
 
In another study, Schmid complied 109 scholarly articles that define terrorism, 
and listed the definitional elements according to their frequency mentioned in different 
definitions in descending order. 
 
Element Frequency
Violence, force 83.5% 
Political 65% 
Threat 51% 
(Psych.)effects and (anticipated)  reactions 41.5% 
Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action 32% 
Method of combat, strategy, tactic 30.5% 
Extra normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian 
constraints 
30% 
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance 28% 
                                                 
3 Alex P. Schmid, “Five Frameworks for Conceptualizing the Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 16 (2006): p.197-221 
4 “Anti-Terror Law No 3713,” Official Gazette, No 20843 vol. 30, 12 April 1991, cited in Beril 
Dedeoglu,  “Bermuda Triangle: Comparing Official Definitions of Terrorist Activity,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 15 (2004):  p. 100 
3 
Publicity aspect 21.5% 
Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination 21% 
Civilians, noncombatants, neutral, outsiders as victims 17.5% 
Intimidation 17% 
Innocence of victims emphasized 15.5% 
Group, movement, organization as perpetrator 14% 
Symbolic aspect, demonstrators to others 13.5% 
Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence 9% 
Clandestine, covert nature 9% 
Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence 7% 
Criminal 6% 
Demands made on third parties 4% 
Table 1 Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Scholarly Definitions of 
Terrorism5 
 
Using 16 elements out of 23 he defines terrorism broadly as: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to 
assassination—the direct targets of violence are generally chosen 
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as a message 
generators. Threat- and violence based communication process between 
terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to 
manipulate the main target (audiences), turning it into a target of demands, 
or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or 
propaganda is primarily sought.6 
  
As observed from the differences between the broadest definitions of terrorism by 
Schmid—that tried to include almost every scholarly element related to terrorism—and 
the Turkish Anti-Terror Law definition, every country defines it according to their unique 
concerns.  Threats to constitutionally determined characteristics of the Turkish Republic 
                                                 
5 Alex P. Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, 
data bases, theories, & literature (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2005), p.36 
6Ibid. p.39 
4 
(democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law7), indivisible territorial 
and national integrity, and state authority are viewed as vital elements for defining 
terrorist acts in Turkey, whereas the U.S. administration defines it more generally as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents” in its 2002 The National 
Security Strategy.8 That is to say, perceptions of terrorism in Turkey and in the US are 
different, in addition to many other different views within these countries. 
B. TERRORISM AS A WICKED PROBLEM  
The length of the Schmid’s  definition and the variety of its elements  indicates 
that terrorism, the most dangerous threat to world’s security today, is a subject that is 
related to various disciplines such as political science, organizational theory, psychology, 
sociology,  law, criminology, military, computer science, systems analysis and so on. The 
involvement of people with different concerns, as victims or perpetrators, as supporters or 
opposition, as policy makers or policy implementers, adds to its social complexity. 
Stakeholders are not only individuals but organizations and countries at the macro level. 
Its existence from the very beginning of the recorded history—beginning with the Zealots 
in Roman Empire era, Assassins in 12th century, Anarchists in 19th century, Nationalists 
in 20th   century  and various factions today ranging from religious extremists to ethnic 
nationalists9-- reveals that terrorism has no simple, prescribed solution. Moreover, studies 
show that some solutions implemented by various countries in the past have had a reverse 
effect and caused more problems than it solved. All these indications reveal that terrorism 
is a “wicked problem,” because it fits almost all the characteristics of the wicked 
problems. 
1. Characteristics of Wicked Problems 
Drawing from Rittel Horst, and Melvin Weber (1973), Naval Post Graduate 
School’s Nancy Roberts identifies basic characteristics of wicked problems: 
 
                                                 
7 “Characteristics of the Republic,” Turkish Constitution article 2, available at  
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/constitution.htm  accessed 15 October 2006  
8White House, “The National Security Strategy 2002,” p.5 available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss3.html  accessed 18 October 2006    
9 Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: Thee Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random 
House, 2005), 11- 16 
5 
• There is no single definition of a “wicked problem.” 
• Underlying factors giving rise to a “wicked problem” are complex 
and intertwined, and little things may make huge differences 
(butterfly effect: cause of a tornado in pacific may be a butterfly 
flapping its wings in China) 
• “Wicked problems” have no stopping rule (it is always possible to 
produce a ‘better’ solution). 
• Solutions to “wicked problems” are not true or false but good or 
bad. Stakeholders’ judgments are likely to differ widely in accord 
with their group or personal interest, their special value-sets, and 
their ideological partiality. Their assessments of proposed solutions 
are expressed as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or more likely ‘better’ or ‘worse’ 
or ‘satisfying’ or ‘good enough’.  
• There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a 
wicked problem. 
• Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot’ operation. 
Because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, every 
attempt counts significantly. Every implemented solution is 
consequential. It leaves traces that cannot be undone; there is no 
“undo” button. Solutions have irreversible consequences which 
affect many people’s lives. 
• Every wicked problem is unique. 
• Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of 
another problem.10 
 
Almost all these characteristics also apply to terrorism: 
 
• There is no single definition of terrorism.  
• There are plenty of studies about underlying causes of terrorism 
concluding that there may be various root causes ranging from poverty to 
lack of political representation. 
• Every country tries to find a better solution for terrorism in accord with 
the stakeholder’s interests that are concerned with terrorism and their 
value sets. 
• The steps attempting to solve problem of terrorism have irreversible 
consequences which affect people’s lives, especially in oppressive 
regimes. 
                                                 
10 Nancy Roberts, Course lecture on Coping with the Wicked Problems at NPS, October 2006; Rittel, 
Horst, and Melvin Weber, “Dilemmas in General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences, 4 (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Scientific Publishing, 1973) p.155-159 
6 
• No solution to terrorism can be said to be the best. 
• Terrorism should be examined in context of conditions that are unique to 
the context in question. 
• The solutions implemented to solve the problem of terrorism may cause 
even greater problems. 
2. Taming Strategies for Wicked Problems 
There are several ways for taming (attempting to solve) wicked problems, 
according to Jeff Conklin: 
 
1.  Lock down the problem definition. Develop a description of a related 
problem or a sub-problem that you can solve, and declare that to be the 
problem. Resist all efforts to expand or modify the problem definition.  
2.  Assert that the problem is solved. Since a wicked problem has no 
definitive solution, the whole point of attempting to tame it is so that a 
solution can be reached 
3.  Specify objective parameters by which to measure the solution’s 
success. This is the measurement approach.  
4.  Cast the problem as “just like” a previous problem that has been 
solved. Ignore or filter out evidence that complicates the picture. 
5.  Give up on trying getting a good solution to the problem. Just follow 
orders, do your job, and try not to get in trouble. 
6.  Declare that there are just a few possible solutions, and focus on 
selecting from among these options. A specific way to do this is to 
frame the problem in “either/or” terms, e.g., “Should we attack Iraq or 
let the terrorists take over the world?”11  
 
Taming strategies are not effective in dealing with wicked problems. They are 
piecemeal efforts that often have unintended consequences and make the wicked 
problems even worse. Rather than relying on taming strategies Roberts offers to take a 
systems approach as a way of coping with wicked problems.12 This thesis follows that 
path and examines terrorism from a systems perspective. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Jeff Conklin, “Wicked Problems and the Social Complexity,” available at 
http://cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.pdf  accessed on 12 October 2006  
12 Nancy Roberts, “Coping with the Wicked Problems,” class lecture at the NPS October 2006 
7 
C. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS  
This study on terrorism training assumes that terrorism is a wicked problem and 
there are various strategies to cope with it. A systems approach is one of the coping 
strategies and it is the approach taken in this research. A system is a whole composed of 
complex organized elements (sub-systems) interacting with each other and with their 
environment. The stability of a system depends on its components’ alignment. If one of 
its components is misaligned, it may be possible to destabilize or even disrupt the whole 
system. In terms of terrorism, subsystems of the terrorism are training subsystem, 
logistics subsystem, management subsystem and operational subsystem. Each of these 
components of the terrorist system is inter-dependent and functions to import inputs from 
the environment, process them, and export outputs to the environment again. These 
outputs are in the form of violent acts. 
The counter terrorism measures today focus on misaligning operational, logistics 
or management subsystems. They attempt to find, capture or kill the terrorists and their 
leaders or cut the financial and logistical resources that feed the terrorist system. 
However, it is a simple mathematical rule that if these strategies do not kill or capture 
more than the terrorist system recruits, terrorism problems will grow. It is the training 
subsystem that recruits and equips the terrorists with motivation and skills to kill. This 
study takes the position that the training subsystem is the most critical component, 
because it imports the energy to the system—the people who are trained to be terrorists—
and then enables the whole system to function. Thus, this research focuses on the training 
subsystem and structure of the study is as follows: 
Chapter II defines terrorism and terrorist organizations in systems terms, explains 
the components and interrelations among the components, and concludes that the most 
important component of the system is the training subsystem.  Thus, we should 
comprehend how the training subsystem can be understood in system terms. 
Chapter III focuses on the training subsystem and explains the types of terrorist 
training, how the terrorists and their organizations learn (process), what the terrorists 
learn (content) and where the terrorists learn (location). This chapter concludes that the 
internet is the new safe haven for terrorist training, demonstrating the adaptive capability 
of terrorist system moving from land based to the internet-based training. 
8 
Chapter IV explains how terrorists use the internet, especially in their training 
activities, and discovers that much of the efforts to counter “terrorism-online” concentrate 
on web-based use of the internet. New technologies introduced with broadband internet 
enables peer-to-peer networks and may potent a new trend. The more decentralized 
nature of peer-to-peer networks makes monitoring internet more difficult; in addition,  
these new technologies create new opportunities for terrorist use. The chapter concludes 
that web presence of the terrorist networks should be stopped as their geographical 
presence is being destroyed. 
Chapter V examines how a terrorist organization uses the internet especially for 
motivational training of its current and prospective militants. The chapter applies social 
network analysis to identify the web presence of the website network of terrorist PKK 
(Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan), a terrorist organization on the United States’ and European 
Union’s designated terrorist organizations list. It supports techniques to eliminate terrorist 
PKK’s web presence. 
Chapter VI concludes the study and recommends policy implications for coping 
with the wicked problem of terrorism. 
9 
II. TERRORISM AS A SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The open system framework comes from the “general system theory” of Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy in the 1940s. Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn introduced the open system 
theory in their seminal work, the Social Psychology of Organizations.13 Since then this 
interdisciplinary framework of organizations replaced the old limited structural approach. 
Open system theory views organizations as systems interacting with the 
environment, or in Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s words “organized cohesive complex of 
elements standing in interaction.”14 The interaction refers to both the relationship 
between a system and its environment, and among the complex elements of the system 
(subsystems). Subsystems perform the specific functions required for organizational 
survival, such as production, boundary spanning, maintenance, adaptation, and 
management.15 Organizations’ survivability depends on the proper and aligned 
functioning of these subsystems. 
Systems inherently are exposed to entropy—a term originated in 
thermodynamics—which means the tendency for systems to move forward to a chaotic or 
random state, in which there is no potential for energy, transformation or work. 
“Organism” is a metaphor for organizations which grow, adapt, spawn and sometimes 
die. At other times their existence is due to negative entropy (store of energy, winter fat 
of the organizations16), by which organizations may live indefinitely. An organization’s 
effectiveness and success depends heavily on its ability to adapt to its environment, shape 
the environment, or find a favorable environment in which to operate.17  
All open systems have the following basic characteristics: 
 
                                                 
13 Troy S Thomas at al., Warlords Rising, (New York: Lexington Books,2005) p.11  
14 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, 1976, quoted in Troy S Thomas at al.’, Warlords Rising, (New York: 
Lexington Books,2005) p.11 
15 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design (Mason , OH: Thomson South Western, 2004),14  
16 William D. Casebeer, quoted in Troy S Thomas at al.’, Warlords Rising, (New York: Lexington 
Books,2005) p.16 
17 Daft, p.15 
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1. They import energy and resources from the environment (input) 
2. They transform this energy and resources (throughput)  
3. They export the product to the environment (output) 
4. They adapt their components in a dynamic pattern of activities (feedback).  
B. TERRORISM AS AN OPEN SYSTEM 
Terrorist systems are open social systems importing the inputs (people, money, 
weapon, and information etc.) into the transformation process to export the output (fear, 
terror, intimidation, awareness, coercion, mobilization) into the environment  to achieve 
the organization’s primary task. The feedback mechanism enables the organizations to 
adapt to an unstable environment; also, it allows the subsystems to work in alignment 
with each other.  
 
Figure 1 Terrorism as a System  
 
Previous studies about terrorism and counterterrorism were compartmentalized 
into some specific categories such as psychological, environmental, organizational or 
instrumental. All the components of the terrorist system (inputs, outputs, environment, 





















organizations in systems terms, first we have to understand these components and the 
relationships between and among these components. These relationships are not constant 
but dynamic. The dynamic nature of these relationships is a power of dark organizations 
in terms of their adaptation to their environments. 
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND USE OF 
TERRORISM (OUTPUTS) 
There are many studies explaining the relationship between environment and use 
of terrorism and the emergence of terrorist organizations. The primary effect of the 
environment to the terrorist organizations is that environment has a preparatory effect on 
individuals (input) to participate in the terrorist organization. 
The environment in which terrorist organizations operate consists of target 
audiences from which the organization seeks support, other rival organizations that have 
the same goal, counter terrorism organizations that add more turbulence to the 
environment, and social, political and economic conditions.  
Ted Robert Gurr observes that there is a relationship between economic disparity 
and the tendency of individuals to resort to violence, and he generalizes this disparity 
with the term “relative deprivation.” Relative deprivation is the discrepancy between the 
“ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction.18 One of the main pillars of his 
approach is how long the group is subjected to feelings of deprivation and the extent to 
which it believes things may change. The longer that deprivation persists, combined with 
the subjective feeling that chances of change are small, the inclination to violence will 
grow.19  
Krueger and Maleckova argue that the evidence they presented in their study 
suggests that there is little direct connection between poverty, level of education, and 
taking part in terrorism. Their analyses of datasets about Hezbollah members and 
Palestinian suicide bombers show that they come from economically advantageous 
families, and they have relatively high levels of education compared to the general 
population.20  
                                                 
18 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970) 
19 Scot Atran, “Mishandling the Suicide Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly, p. 77-79 
20 Alan B. Kruger and Jetka Maleckova, “Poverty, Education and Terrorism: Is there a Causal 
Connection?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, Fall 2003, p.119-144  
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The 9/11 Commission report reached a similar conclusion: “Terrorism is not 
caused by poverty. Yet when people lose hope, when societies break down, when 
countries are fragmented, the breeding ground for terrorism is created.”21  
A causal relationship between economic systems in the environment and terrorism 
is another subject that was studied by Michael Mousseau. He argues that there is a 
contract-based relationship between people in liberal democracies and a clientalist 
relationship in authoritarian societies, and the economic integration of the society has a 
great effect on terrorism: 
Social integration with contracts promotes respect for individual choice, 
the equal rights of strangers, and religious and cultural tolerance: the 
cultural base of the liberal state. Social integration with reciprocity 
promotes acceptance of the group beliefs and values, loyalty to the group 
leaders and distrust of outsiders: the cultural basis of authoritarianism and 
sectarianism. In this way, a socio-economy of reciprocity is a necessary 
condition for the resort to terror and genocide and a leading cause for 
illiberal democracy, ethnic separatism, and weak and failed states in the 
developing world.22  
Thinking of the results of the studies, which concludes that the majority of the 
terrorists come from wealthy or middle class families, and the reality that people 
become more engaged politically and ideologically when they reached a fairly high 
standard of living, and that terrorism is the most extreme form of political engagement, 
one wonders if wealth is the reason. Daniel Pipes argues that “the spread of free market 
capitalism and liberal democracy . . . is probably an important factor in rising political 
Islam.”23 The main pillar of his argument is that wealth, freedom of speech, and 
representation of extreme ideas that are offered by capitalism and liberal democracy in 
the Middle East also creates sources and opportunity for radical movements. 
Another popularly argued theme is the correlation between the democratic 
conditions in the environment and terrorism. F. Gregory Gause III argued that there is 
little data to support the notion that democracies directly diminish the prospect of 
                                                 
21 Quoted in Yonatan Levy, “9/11 Report: The Middle East Dimension,” available at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/distribution/Pol890.doc  accessed 13 September 2006 
22 Michael Mousseau, “The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: 
Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence,” International Studies Quarterly,  47,  December 2003, pp. 483-510 
23 Daniel Pipes, “God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?,” National Interest, 66 
Winter 2001/2002 , p. 14-21 
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terrorism.24 Citing the survival of ETA after Spanish transition from dictatorship to 
democracy, the IRA in the UK, one of the oldest democracies, terrorist attacks in India, 
the world’s largest democracy, the Red Army faction in West Germany, and the 
Oklahoma City bomber, Gause demonstrates that democracies are equally susceptible to 
terrorism. On the other hand China, an authoritarian state, had no terrorist incident 
reported in State Department’s Patterns of Global terrorism report.25 As Dr. Michael 
Freeman concluded, democracy may be a cure for tyranny but not a good cure for 
terrorism.26 
Erica Chenoweth looks at the environment from a government stability 
perspective. According to Chenoweth, levels of democracy do not necessarily diminish 
the likelihood of terrorist development.27 Instead, the political stability of the existing 
regime is the most significant factor affecting the origins of terrorism. She argues that the 
results in her study appear to show that governments should crack down on terrorism and 
revoke civil liberties in order to maintain stability, but defeating terrorism is not always 
the desired outcome. Implying state repression and state terror, she concludes that 
“stability, no less than revolution, may have its own kind of terror.”28 How the 
government of Peru’s struggle and achievement against Shining Path turned into a tool of 
eliminating political rivals and consolidating the tyrannical power of Fujimori is an apt 
example to show the need for separating terrorists from the population in the efforts of 
counterterrorism29. 
The effects of other rival organizations in the environment are another 
relationship between an organization and the degree of terror that the organization may 
employ. Mia Bloom argues that if there are similar organizations in the environment it is 
likely that the violence will escalate as a result of rivalry among the groups. She supports 
                                                 
24 F. Gregory Gause III, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005 
25 US State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism, East Asia and Pacific, China” available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64336.htm accessed on 13 July 2005. 
26 Michael Freeman, Unpublished Scripts, 2006 
27 Erica Chenoweth, “Instability and Opportunity: The Origins of Terrorism in Weak and Failed 
States” in The Making of a Terrorist ed. James J. F Forest, vol.3 Root Causes, (Westport CT: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2006) p. 17-31 
28 Ibid. 21 
29 “State of Fear: Peru’s Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación,” 2004, DVD, New Day Films 
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her argument by giving examples from three Palestinian groups Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.30   
D. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUTPUTS AND ENVIRONMENT 
The outputs of terrorist groups are basically creating fear and a sense of 
insecurity, intimidation, mobilization of the population around their cause, awareness 
(propaganda by the deed), and coercion of the government until they reach their goals.  
The effects of the outputs of terrorist systems on an environment or population were 
studied by Friedland and Merrari in a survey on the Israeli population about their 
willingness to concede to terrorist demands.31 
 
 
Figure 2 The Relationship between importance, Threat Intensity and Public 
Willingness to Concede to Terrorist Demands 
 
According to their study, during early stages the terrorist threats can lead to a 
strengthening of public resolve not to concede. The extent and the degree to which such 
strengthening might occur is related to the importance of the issue to the public; the more 
important the issue, the greater the strengthening of resolving not to concede in the face 
                                                 
30 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: the Allure of Suicide Terror, (New York: Columbia Uni. Press, 2005) 
31 Friedland and Ariel Merrari, cited in Maxwell Taylor, The Terrorist, ( New York: Brassey’s 











of the threat. However, the more prolonged the threat, regardless of the importance of the 
issue, the greater eventually is the probability of conceding to the terrorist demands. 
The importance of the subject to the public is in relative terms, and the 
importance of the same issue may be perceived differently in various societies. The 
secessionist demands of ETA and the importance of the issue in the minds of Spanish 
people compared to the same demands of terrorist organization PKK and the importance 
of the issue in the Turkish public’s mind are relatively different. Consequently, Spanish 
people seem to be satisfied with the autonomy given to the region by the Spanish 
government. On the other hand, the Turkish public is unwilling to appease terrorist 
PKK’s demands, although almost everyday a terrorist incident occurs in the country.  
E. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUTPUTS AND INPUTS 
The output of the terrorist system is communication with the environment, what 
Gordon McCormick calls “signaling strategy.”32 Terrorist plots are a message to 
intimidate the enemy as well as a message to their support (and prospective support) 
groups that they are strong enough to challenge the enemy’s superior power. The fear and 
insecurity they create in a population’s mind leads the population to think that their 
security forces are not capable of providing the services that they are supposed to; thus 
there is more cause for the population to support the terrorist organization. Without 
support a terrorist organization cannot survive. To enable recruitment and logistical 
support, they have to demonstrate enough violence or terrorism, which they see as 
“propaganda by deed.” The money that they make from the terrorist acts like extortion, 
bank robberies, and drug trafficking is funneled back as an input to sustain the 
organization. As a result the outputs of the terrorism system attract or try to mobilize the 
population to support the terrorist organization and its cause. 
Not only outputs affect the inputs, but also inputs have effects on the outputs. The 
terrorist organizations try to recruit very selectively according to distinct criteria which 
will be discussed in detail in next chapter, because the wrong people may cause adverse 
consequences for the terrorist organization. 
 
                                                 
32 Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling and Suicide Attack,” Studies in 
Conflict and  Terrorism, 2004,27, p. 243-281 
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F. INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN SUBSYSTEMS 
Systems must overcome the universal law of nature in which all forms of systems 
move toward disorganization or death. Congruence, sometimes referred to fit or 
alignment, is a prerequisite for systems to operate efficiently. Congruence is defined as 
the relations among the internal system components and between systems and their 
environments.33 As suggested in Figure 1, terrorism system is composed of four 
subsystems that fulfill the necessary functions. These subsystems are dependent on each 
other, and one’s dysfunction can cause the entire system to collapse. 
The training subsystem recruits from a population, equips the recruits with 
necessary mindsets and skills, and enables the system to adapt to the hostile environment 
by means of organizational learning. Social organizations, because they are open systems, 
can import more energy from the environment than is immediately required and store it 
for use during periods of crises such as a concentrated counter-terrorism campaign. This 
process is called negative entropy. Unless the negative entropy capability is shattered, the 
terrorist organization will survive.  The training subsystem is the main creator of negative 
entropy. 
The operational subsystem is responsible for directly producing the outcomes of 
the terrorist system, which is very important for its survival. As Gordon McCormick 
writes, “Terrorist groups must maintain a minimum violent presence to remain effective. . 
. To hold their audience (and hold themselves together) they must continue to act.”34 
The logistics subsystem is responsible for providing necessary resources that 
other subsystems need to fulfill their functions. This subsystem is the closest subsystem 
to the environment from which the terrorist organization is fed, so this subsystem must 
act in very clandestine manner in order to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of its 
population and the government. Also the distinction between the sympathizers and active 
members of the terrorist organization blurs in this level in terms of counterterrorism 
activities. Security forces have to be ready to confront the problems posed by this blurry 
situation in their efforts not to play into the terrorists’ hands, who try to provoke 
overreaction of the government. 
                                                 
33 Michael I. Harrison and Arie Shirom, Organizational Diagnosis and Assessment: Bridging Theory 
and Practice, (Thousand Oaks, CA Sage Publications), 1999, p.52 
34 Hoffman and McCormick, p. 245 
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The management subsystem is responsible for decision making, strategy 
development, and exercising control or influence over the organization. The influence 
and control over the organization changes from group to group, based on ideology and 
counterterrorism measures, but the coordinator role of this sub-system is common in all 
terrorist organizations. PKK is an example of a highly hierarchical terrorist organization 
as a result of its Marxist Leninist ideology that sees the organization as a vanguard of the 
alleged movement. On the other hand, Al Qaeda is at the other extreme--franchising 
terrorism around the world with terror entrepreneurs. However, both core management 
subsystems approve and coordinate the terrorist actions.   
G. CONCLUSION 
Terrorist systems are complex, open systems that have some unique 
characteristics, as stated by Virginia Anderson and Lauren Johnson35: 
1. Complex systems tend to be self stabilizing 
This characteristic explains why so many terrorist organizations still exist 
although there is enormous efforts to stop them functioning. They mutate to fit their 
environment; first, to survive, and second, to achieve their goals. 
2. Complex systems are or appear to be purposeful 
Terrorist systems stabilize themselves by means of various strategies that may 
appear to be in conflict with the organization’s overall goal. However, their actions are 
purposeful, because the terrorist organizations use various reinforcing loops—(loops 
compound change in one direction with even more change in that direction)--to align the 
overall goal of the system. They also use some balancing loops (loops or interventions to 
the system that try to bring things to the desired state and keep them there) that dampen 
system action. For example, terrorist organizations want as many members as possible, 
but this endangers the underground nature of the organizations and makes them 
susceptible to destruction by counter terrorism agencies; thus they use a balancing loop to 
decrease or minimize the active membership for survival, especially in the initial stage. 
 
                                                 
35 Virginia Anderson and Lauren Johnson, Systems Thinking Basics, (Massachusetts: Pegasus 
Communications Inc., 1997), p.78-79 
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3. Complex systems, like simpler systems, are capable of using feedback to modify their 
behavior 
The self-stabilizing function is achieved by a feedback mechanism between all the 
components of the system. The operational subsystem arranges levels of violence 
according to feedback that comes from the environment (population). The logistics sub-
system sends feedback to the management subsystem to find new methods for 
maintaining financial support. The training subsystem arranges itself according to the 
feedback that comes from the increasing pressures of counterterrorism agencies, and 
finds new ways to recruit and train its members.  
4. Complex systems can modify their environments 
The main goal of terrorist organizations is to modify their environments, simply 
because they are not pleased with the current environment, be it the economic system, 
constitutional conditions or current territorial structure of the country. Unlike other lobby 
organizations, they try to change it by violence. 
5. Complex systems are capable of replicating, maintaining, repairing, and 
reorganizing themselves. 
Al Qaeda is an example of how a terrorist organization replicates itself. It began 
with a hierarchical structure, and now no one knows exactly what it is--an organization, a 
network, a movement, or a global insurgency.  
After explaining how terrorism destabilizes its environment in system terms, it 
must also be noted that systems thinking can also be used to destabilize terrorist systems. 
The strategy depends on the time, tolerance of the consequences of the strategies, and 
decisiveness on the strategies.   For example one could cut the energy that the system 
imports (i.e., financial support), misalign one or more sub-systems (i.e., the training 
subsystem), create  a turbulent environment that the terrorist system can not tolerate (i.e., 
increase troop numbers); changing the environment in a way that it can not affect the 
inputs to resort terrorism (i.e. bring democracy to the Middle East, because democracies 
don’t fight each other); or change the environment in a way that the outputs of the 
terrorist systems can be absorbed or tolerated by the environment, and do nothing (i.e. 
more people die in traffic accidents than do in terrorist plots). All these alternatives come 
with their own side effects and tradeoffs that counter terrorism agencies must consider. In 
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light of these arguments, the next chapter will explain the training subsystem of terrorist 
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III. TERRORIST TRAINING AS A SUBSYSTEM 
Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit 
absurdities. 
                                                                                                                   Voltaire 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The terrorism phenomenon has been explained in a variety of ways, ranging from 
the psychological level to the political level. All these explanations have merit, and are 
valuable in understanding this complicated or wicked phenomenon. However, they are 
inadequate in explaining why an overwhelming majority of people who have the same 
grievances as the people who take violent actions, does not employ terrorism. Although 
the active terrorists are scornful and critical of the great numbers of the others who 
remain behind, Ehud Sprinzak argues that people who employ terrorism always need a 
rearguard who do not engage in terrorism, because no terror underground is capable of 
sustaining itself without a non-terrorist support system of friends and accomplices who 
provide information, hideouts, escape routes, and supplies.36   As will be discussed in this 
chapter, the difference between those who resort to terrorism and those who do not comes 
from the conditioning process the former is exposed to. Understanding this conditioning 
process in which terrorists learn violence is critical to developing effective 
counterterrorism strategies.  
B. CONCEPTUALIZING THE TERRORIST TRAINING SUBSYSTEM 
1. Functions of the Terrorist Training Subsystem 
Before examining the process, explaining the importance of the outcomes of the 
terrorist training subsystem and what it means for the whole terrorist system is useful. 
The training subsystem creates, intensifies and sustains the competence, 
commitment and the skills that the terrorists will apply to reach their goals. No one is 
born with the will and knowledge of how to build bombs, use pistols, conduct 
                                                 
36 Ehud Sprinzak, “The psycho political formation of extreme left terrorism in a democracy: The case 
of Weatherman,” in Origins of Terrorism ed. Walter Reich, (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press) p.85  
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surveillance, or hijack airplanes. These are skills that must be taught and practiced. In 
addition, the training builds in a desire to acquire these skills. 
The training subsystem not only teaches the ways and means, but also justifies 
them by means of intensive indoctrination. After training, neither the people who are 
killed in bloody plots are considered innocent, nor are terrorist assassinations, bombings, 
abductions or robberies thought of as evil doings. They all have different meanings as a 
result of the indoctrination process they experience. The training not only instills the 
moral rightness and importance of the cause for militant action, but also creates a sense of 
eliteness and provides the social rewards of solidarity and group esteem for excelling in 
terrorist exploits.37    
The training subsystem establishes ties to the group and creates a sense of 
belonging. Understanding group dynamics will explain why creating group identity is the 
priority for any given terrorist establishment, be it revolutionary leftist, ethnic separatist, 
or religious. No terrorist group wants their members to act absolutely free from the group. 
They prefer to function in a group setting, in which the individuals are strongly 
influenced by the powerful forces of group dynamics. According to Post, the group 
dynamics of various terrorist groups differ significantly based on the ideology that they 
support. “The nationalist-separatist terrorists are often known in their communities and 
maintain relationships with friends and family outside the group. They can move into and 
out of the community with relative ease. In contrast, for anarchic-ideologues, the decision 
to cross the boundary and enter the underground illegal group is an irrevocable one.”38 
We can add the religious groups to the first category in which terrorists share the same 
but more radical beliefs with the community in which they are embedded. 
The training subsystem enables knowledge to be stored inside the boundaries of 
the system, and facilitates its passing through generations. We can call this function by 
the name “organizational learning.” The system starts with the basic knowledge of the 
founders’ experiences or the system’s ideological domain and it adapts itself to the 
hostile environment by means of the learning process. 
                                                 
37 Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement” in Origins of Terrorism ed. Walter Reich, 
(Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press), p.186 
38 Jerold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-logic” in Origins of Terrorism, ed. Walter Reich, , (Washington 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press): p.32-33 
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2. How are Terrorists Trained? 
Conventional thought on terrorist training was that it was brainwashing. 
Brainwashing first drew public attention through the treatment of American POWs in 
Korea, whose susceptibility to communist propaganda was the main concern. The Patty 
Hearst case in 1970s also made media headlines. The tapes made by Patty Hearst, 
declaring her solidarity with her captors, The Symbionese Liberation Army, created 
speculations that her personality had been systematically manipulated by indoctrination 
under extreme stress. “At her trial in 1974, after an armed robbery on the behalf of 
Symbionese Liberation Army, psychiatrics experts on brainwashing such as Dr Margaret 
Singer, Lois J. West and Robert Lifton testified in favor of Hearst. Although Hearst was 
convicted, many observers viewed her as a victim of brainwashing.”39 
The “brainwashing” explanation is obviously an oversimplification of the 
terrorism phenomenon, and it eliminates the responsibility of the individuals for their 
deadly actions, as Sheflin and Opton indicate: “When a society turns its eyes away from 
the deepest question off responsibility, brainwashing becomes the explanation that avoids 
the responsibility of looking inwards.”40 However, the “brainwashing” explanation is not 
valueless as applied to terrorism. Studies about the reverse process of brainwashing 
called “deprogramming” may be useful in terms of the rehabilitation of the detained 
terrorists to normal social life. 
Another explanation of terrorist training is that it is a normal learning process 
generally applied in any training and education institution. The methodology used in the 
process of terrorist training appears to be universal due to the universal characteristics of 
human learning and behavior change. Explaining these characteristics is, at the same 
time, explaining methodology in any terrorist training system. 
There are two dimensions of learning: process and content. The content of 
terrorist training is made up primarily of the ideology that the terrorist group 
follows and the technical skills that terrorists need to conduct their attacks. 
Content varies from group to group, but the process that includes the methods by 
which knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviors are acquired is achieved in four 
                                                 
39 Thomas Robbins and Dick Anthony, “Deprogramming, Brainwashing and the Medicalization of 
Religious Deviant Groups,” Social Problems, 29 February 1982 
40 Alan Sheflin and Edward Upton, Mind Manipulators,( New York: Paddington, 1978),  p. 50 
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basic universal forms: 1) Conditioning, 2) Observational, 3) Instructional, and 4) 
Trial-and-Error. All people learn according to these cognitive-behavioral 
principles, and proper manipulation of these factors makes for good teaching. 41 
The question is how do terrorist organizations manipulate these factors? 
The author has categorized terrorist training into two main levels: 
“individual training” where the individuals learn terrorist tactics and techniques 
mostly derived from the trial-and-error type of process, and organizational 
learning by which their systems learn and maintain their resiliency. Individual 
training has two dimensions: motivational, by which the terrorists develop the will 
to kill, and operational training, by which the terrorists get the skills to kill.42 
  
  
Figure 3 Levels of Terrorist Training 
 
C. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING 
Generally, terrorist training takes place within the boundaries of the 
terrorist system. Planning, coordination, and implementation are all fulfilled in 
formal way of sign up and train the recruits in designated geographical terrorist 
camps. However, the deadly consequences of terrorist attacks by Timothy Mc 
Veigh in Oklahoma City in 1993, separate abortion clinic bombings of Christian 
extremists, and the Casablanca bombings of 2003 by Islamic extremists revealed 
that the individual level of learning is as important as the learning in system 
                                                 
41Bernard Saper, “On Learning Terrorism,” Terrorism ,11 1988,  p.16 
42 The terms “motivational training” and “operational training” are barrowed from James J F Forest, 
Training Camps and Other Centers of Learning” in Teaching Terror, ed James J F Forest (New York, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.) 2006  p.69-109  
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boundaries. Moreover, thanks to the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, terrorist 
systems can not operate as freely as previously, especially in terms of training 
activities, and thus they try to innovate new methods in which individual training 
is their focus with the help of new technologies.  
1. Steps in Individual Training 
1. Continuous propaganda to prepare candidates for militancy. 
2. Selective recruitment. 
3. Manipulation of the individual’s psychological and 
physical environment. 
4. Enabling recruit identification with the group.  
5. Assigning the trainee to a real target to prove his 
commitment and maturity at the end of the training process. 
These steps seem to overlap with military training in boot camps, where volunteer 
or obligatory individuals are trained in isolated posts to be taught--in simple terms--how 
to kill the enemy. The boot camp metaphor does not completely fit the terrorist training 
situation, but it has still has value in terms of the universality of the principles of 
teaching. Margaret Singer, who was a leading scholar in mind manipulation in cults at 
Berkeley University, gives the differences between an American Marine and a cult 
recruit, which has many similarities with terrorist organizations in terms of training and 
creating a group identity.43 
a) Step 1: Continuous Propaganda to Prepare Appropriate 
Conditions for Militancy 
The recruit has to be open to the ideology and the main goal of the 
terrorist system. Depending on the ideology of the terrorist system, a recruit has to have 
some common points with the system in ethnicity, religion, sect of a particular religion, 
race, or grievances; or in other words,  the individual must be at least on the fourth floor 
in Fathali Moghaddam’s “staircase metaphor” to be recruited. Moghaddam argues that 
the staircase to terrorism is conceived of as having a ground floor and five higher 
                                                 
43 See the list where a marine recruit differs from a terrorist recruit. Margaret Singer, “How the United 
States Marine Corps Differs from Cults” available at 
http://www.csj.org/studyindex/studycult/study_marine.htm accessed on 10 June 2006  
26 
floors.44 On the ground floor, perceptions of fairness and feelings of relative deprivation 
dominate. Some individuals from the disgruntled population will climb to the first floor 
to seek solutions, but if they do not see possibilities for individual mobility and do not 
feel that they can adequately influence the process in which decisions are made, they 
keep on climbing. 
On the second floor the individual gets frustrated and displaces his or her 
grievances onto the enemy, and individuals more prone to psychically displace 
aggression onto the enemy climb further up the staircase. 
On the third floor the individual begins to perceive the terrorist strategy as 
morally justified. Those who become more fully engaged with the morality of the 
terrorist system keep climbing up the staircase and become ready for terrorist 
recruitment. Terrorist systems continuously engage in propaganda campaigns to lead the 
targeted population to reach the third step, from where they can recruit their candidates or 
import energy into their boundaries in systems terms. 
b) Step 2: Selective Recruitment 
Recruitment is the most important function of terrorist organizations to 
survive and reach their ends. Recruitment has to be selective because the terrorist system 
cannot afford the costs stemming from faulty recruitment strategies. The wrong strategy 
in recruitment would affect the whole system. If the system does not import the 
appropriate input from the environment, the process will not be able to transform these 
inputs into appropriate throughputs to perform the overall goal of the system. The 
terrorist system has to use its resources very efficiently because they are very scarce. If 
the outcome of the training subsystem is not competent enough to perform their functions 
then they are likely to be captured or killed without doing much harm to the enemy 
wasting the system’s scarce sources, and moreover, risking the underground nature of the 
whole terrorist system. Thus terrorist systems choose their recruits very selectively. 
Different terrorist systems have different selection criteria. 
The recruit has to prove that he is proficient to be a member of the 
underground system. Physical and mental health and personality must be strong enough 
                                                 
44 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist, February- March 2005, p. 161-162 
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to endure the underground life. For example, in the Al-Qaeda Training Manual, necessary 
qualifications and character for the organization’s members are stated as follows: 
 
1. Islam: The member of the organization must be Muslim. 
2. Commitment to Organization’s Ideology: This commitment frees 
the organization members from conceptual problems. 
3. Maturity: The requirements of military work are numerous, and a 
minor cannot perform them. 
4. Sacrifice: He [the member] has to be willing to do the work and 
undergo martyrdom for the purpose of achieving the goal and 
establishing the religion of majestic Allah. 
5. Listening and Obedience: In the military, this is known today as 
discipline. It is expressed by how the member obeys the orders 
given to him. This is what our religion urges. 
6. Keeping Secrets and Concealing Information: . . . Allah says, 
“Even though their plots were such that as to shake the hills!” 
[Koranic verse]. Allah’s messenger-God bless and keep him- says, 
“Seek Allah’s help in doing your affairs in secrecy.” 
7. Free of Illness: Allah says, “There is no blame for those who are 
infirm, or ill, or no resources to spend.” 
8. Patience 
9. Tranquility and “Unflappability” 
10. Intelligence and Insight 
11. Caution and Prudence 
12. Truthfulness and Counsel 
13. Ability to Observe and Analyze 
14. Ability to Act, Change Positions and Conceal Oneself.45 
 
Hamas’s selection criteria for suicide bombings are explained by Salah 
Sh’hadeh, commander of the Ezzedeen al-Qasam brigades in an interview posted in the 
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QUESTION: How do you choose who will carry out a martyrdom 
operation? 
SH’HADEH: The choice is made according to four criteria: First, devout 
religious observance. Second, we verify that the young man complies with 
his parents’ wishes and loved by his family, and that his martyrdom will 
not affect family life--that is, he is not the head of the family and he has 
siblings, as we will not take an only child. Third, his ability to carry out 
the task assigned to him, and to understand its gravity; and fourth, his 
martyrdom should encourage others to carry out martyrdom operations 
and encourage jihad in the hearts of people.46  
The conclusions of the studies about terrorist personalities generally states 
that the radical Islamist terrorists are psychologically normal, relatively well educated 
compared to the general population, and come from middle or upper middle class 
families. This conclusion often times surprises the reader, even the researcher. But the 
selective selection principle of terrorist organizations explains the reason for those 
conclusions.  
To be selected as a recruit in training camps is not sufficient to be an Al-
Qaeda member, according to Rohan Gunaratna. Only the best of the best are selected to 
carry out the operations. Potential recruits’ other features, such as having a Western 
country citizenships or language capabilities, are additional qualities that an Al-Qaeda 
member has to possess.47 Marc Sageman notes that only ten to thirty percent of the 
people who were trained in Al Qaeda training camps later became members of the 
organization.48   
If the candidate is a direct victim of the designated enemy, it is easier to be 
selected. For example, the black widows in Chechnya whose husbands were killed in 
Chechen Russian conflict, the woman suicide bomber in a Jordanian hotel in 2005 whose 
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brother was killed in Iraq or Palestinian suicide bombers in general are the  
direct victims of the opposite side’s actions.49  
c) Step 3: Manipulating the Recruit’s Physical and Psychological 
Environment 
Physical and psychological isolation is necessary for an individual not to 
think of alternative ways to find solutions to their grievances other than that of the 
organization. In this period, recruits are not allowed to communicate with the outer 
world, and they undergo intensive doctrinal training. The mental burden of the 
indoctrination merges with the physical exhaustion stemming from the time periods of 
training, making trainees more and more isolated, and become more committed to their 
cause and leaders. A daily schedule in Ansar al-Islam training camp in Iraq, in the words 
of a trainer of the camp in Iraq, shows the intensive overload on the trainees: “The daily 
schedule in the camp began with dawn prayers, training, a lecture regarding weapons, 
breakfast, noon prayers, rest, prayers, a lecture regarding Koran recitation, prayers, 
training exercises, and prayers-after which each brother goes to his post where he sleeps 
and stands guard. Around 2:30 a.m. there is a night prayer.”50 
Killing is not a natural thing for a human being under normal conditions, 
and people must abandon their innate inhibitions to kill. Even in cases where the killing is 
morally justified, like war or criminal situations, people hesitate, as Grossman put it in 
his study on “killing.” 
Ardant du Picq’s surveys and observations of the ancients, Holmes’s and 
Keegan’s numerous accounts of ineffectual firing, Holmes’s assessment of 
Argentine firing rates in Falklands War, Griffith’s data on the 
extraordinarily low killing rates among Napoleonic and American Civil 
War Regiments, the British Army’s lesser reenactments of historical 
battles, the FBI’s studies of non-firing rates among law-enforcement 
officers in 1950s and 1960s, and countless other individual and anecdotal 
observations all confirm that the vast majority of combatants throughout 
history at the moment of truth when they could and should kill the enemy, 
have found themselves to be ‘conscientious objectors.51                                                  
49 “Iraqi Woman Confesses to Role in Jordan blasts” Associated Press, November 13 2005 available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9979747/ accessed 20 June 2006  
50 Abu Mohammed al-Salmani, Audio tape release script “The Camp of the Al-Ansaar Fighters in the 
land of Mesopotamia” May 7 2006, available at 
http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0506/rawacamp0506.pdf accessed on 10 October 2006. 
51 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, (New 
York: Little Brown Company, 2004 ), p. XV 
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In the training process a trainee abandons or is supposed to abandon the 
inhibitions through gradual, systematic conditioning. Development of the willingness to 
kill is usually achieved through an evolutionary process, in which recruits may not 
recognize the transformation they are undergoing. 
To make people cold bloodedly take the lives of innocent people in buses, 
shopping malls, and airports to topple rulers or regimes, or other political ends requires 
really powerful psychological mechanisms or what Albert Badura calls “moral 
disengagement.”52  
People who are socialized to perceive killing as a condemnable act can be 
transformed into skilled combatants who may feel pride in taking human life. Members 
of the group defend their militant actions, but condemn those of their adversaries. The 
moral justification comes in combination of various forms according to Bandura’s 
analysis. These forms are:  
 Advantageous Comparison: “the more flagrant the contrasting 
inhumanities, the more likely it is that one’s own destructive conduct will appear trifling 
or even benevolent.”53 According to Bin Laden the 3000 persons killed in the World 
Trade Center terrorist acts were much less compared to the numbers in killed in Palestine, 
Chechnya, Lebanon, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
 Euphemistic Language is used in describing the terrorist acts, victims, and 
the tools that they use. Suicide attack becomes “martyrdom operation”; bombs become 
“vertically deployed anti-personnel devices,” and the bystanders become “collateral 
damage” or “outside current accuracy requirements.” Terrorists label themselves as 
“freedom fighters.” Breaking the laws of the country becomes “civil disobedience.” 
 Displacement of Responsibility: “Under displaced responsibility they 
view their actions stemming from the dictates of authorities rather than from their own  
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personal responsibility.” Nazi prison commandants and their staffs divested themselves 
of personal responsibility for their unprecedented inhumanities;54 they claimed they 
simply carried out their orders. 
Diffusion of Responsibility: This is achieved in several ways, such as 
division of labor and group decision making and collective action. People act more 
cruelly under group responsibility than when they hold themselves personally 
accountable for their actions.55In a situation in which each individual engages in part of 
the terrorist plot, no one actor will feel responsible for the whole detrimental act.  
 Disregard, Distortion of Harmful Consequences: It is easier to harm 
others when their suffering is not visible and when destructive actions are physically and 
temporally remote from their injurious effects. “When people see and hear the suffering 
they cause, vicariously aroused distress and self-censure typically serve as self 
restrainers.”56 A suicide bomber does not see the consequences of his or her action 
simply because he or she will be dead, or a terrorist will not see the consequences of the 
bomb he plants because he will be away when it is detonated. 
Attribution of Blame: In this process, people view themselves as faultless 
victims driven to extreme means by forcible provocation, rather than acting on a 
deliberate decision. According to PKK terrorists their actions are in retaliation to the 
government’s operations to eliminate the terrorist group, rather than deliberate actions 
according to their terrorist agenda. 
Dehumanization: It is difficult to mistreat humanized persons without 
risking self-condemnation. Self-censure against cruel conduct can be disengaged or 
blunted by stripping human qualities from people. Labeling the enemy as “infidels,” 
apostates, monsters, great Satan or axis of evil rather than human beings will lessen the 
amount of self -condemnation after a cruel attack. 
                                                 
54 Neil J. Kressel, “Why People Fallowed Hitler?” in Mass Hate: the Global Rise of Genocide and 
Terror (New York , London: Plennium Press), p.165 
55 Albert Bandura  p.45  
56 Ibid. 
32 
As another form, rationalization can be added to Bandura’s forms of moral 
justification. In an article issued in Kuwait the writer rationalizes the killings of innocent 
people for their involvement in complementary activities: 
It should be noted that in the modern age, when an army is engaged in 
war, non-fighters join it who are involved in complementary activities and, 
at times, the course of war depends mainly on them. These are, for 
example, activators of the army's computer systems that direct military 
activities, such as civilian-manufactured computer systems for directing 
missiles or sophisticated bombs . . . It is common knowledge that the 
Zionist society is a military society, and every one of them takes part in 
warfare, whether as a soldier in the army, as a reservist, by paying taxes to 
the Jewish state and its army which kills Muslims, or by voting to put 
[Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon in a position to give the orders to kill 
[Mohammed] Al-Dura [the child killed in his father's arms in Gaza last 
September] and other Palestinian children .57 
Sayyid Muhammad Fadlallah, a leader of Hezbollah, rationalizes the 
suicide bombing campaign that the organization engaged in Lebanon asking, “What is the 
difference between setting out for battle knowing that you will die after killing ten [of the 
enemy], and setting out to the field to kill ten and knowing you will die while killing 
them?”58 Fadlallah argued that there was no difference.  
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) teaches the new recruits at the very 
beginning—because it is located at the very beginning of their training manual—why 
their violent means are justified: 
The Irish Republican Army, as the legal representatives of the Irish 
people, is morally justified in carrying out a campaign of resistance 
against foreign occupation forces and domestic collaborators. All 
volunteers are and must feel morally justified in carrying out the dictates 
of the legal government; they as the Army are the legal and lawful Army 
of the Irish Republic which has been forced underground by 
overwhelming forces.59 
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Psychologist Anthony Stahelski developed a model of social 
psychological conditioning through which individuals are transformed into terrorists. In 
his model the group first eliminates recruit’s old social and personal identities and then 
reconditions them to identify the group’s enemies as evil sub-humans or non-humans 
who should be killed.60  
Phase 1—Depluralization: stripping away all other group member 
identities 
 




Phase 3—Other-deindividuation: stripping away the personal identities 
of enemies 
 
Phase 4—Dehumanization: identifying enemies as subhuman or 
nonhuman 
 
Phase 5—Demonization: identifying enemies as evil 
Figure 4 Psychological Conditioning Process 
 
d) Step 4: Enabling Recruit Identification with the Group    
As a result of isolation and indoctrination the trainee leaves his self-
character and identifies himself with the group. Individuals call each other with general 
terms like brother, comrade, friend, indicating that they are not individuals anymore, but 
                                                 
60 Anthony Stahelski, “Terrorists Are Made, Not Born: Creating Terrorists Using Social Psychological 
Conditioning,” Journal of Homeland Security, March 2004, available at 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/newjournal/Articles/displayArticle2.asp?article=109  accessed on 6 
November 2006 
34 
a part of a brotherhood or comradeship. Once this achieved it is easier for the recruit to 
carry out what the group says. Dave Grossman points out that “Sometimes the integration 
of the individual in the group so strong that the group’s destruction, e.g., by force or 
captivity, may lead to depression and subsequent suicide.”61 The suicide cases of the 
Baader-Meinhof gang in German prisons can be explained by this excessive group 
identity. 
e) Step 5: Appointing the Trainee to a Real Target to  Prove His 
Commitment  
Dobson and Payne illustrate that Montoneros in Argentina achieve the 
bonding of the recruit to the organization by having him kill a policeman.62 The plot is 
like a practical signature between the terrorist organization and the trainee. The contract 
assures that individual will remain loyal to the group, because he or she is now a fugitive 
for the security forces, and in case he or she decides to escape from the organization, the 
amnesty laws, generally, exclude terrorists who have committed a crime. 
D. MOTIVATIONAL TRAINING 
Motivational training takes place in a variety of ways such as orally, in print, and 
through an online format. Such learning is very important to develop an individual’s will 
to kill. Unlike operational learning, motivational learning is not constrained to  specific 
places or conditions. It can be done in schools, madrassahs, mosques, churches, temples, 
prisons, tea houses, safe houses, and chat rooms. Some governments in their uniform 
education systems breed hatred into their students against their adversaries, creating a 
hate culture which helps recruitment of individuals into radical groups, or creating an 
acceptance in the society for the detrimental acts of terrorist groups. 
 In her study Daphne Burdman analyses how Palestinian children are 
indoctrinated to an ideology of self-sacrifice (martyrdom), giving examples from the 
official text books: “Know my son, that Palestine is your country . . . that its pure soil is 
drenched with the blood of martyrs . . . Question: Why must we fight the Jews and drive 
them out of the country?”(in Arabic language for fifth grade) or from Islamic education 
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for the eighth grade, “Mankind has suffered from this evil both in ancient as well as 
modern times, for indeed Satan has, in the eyes of many people, made their evil actions, 
appear beautiful. . . Such a people are the Jews.”63 The situation on the other side of the 
conflict is no different, according to Elie Podeh: “Previous studies of Israeli textbooks 
have indeed revealed the existence of biases, prejudices and omissions in the description  
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These analyses were important because they exposed the 
often negative and stereotypical way in which the Israeli educational system presented 
the other—the Arab.”64  
Another study done by the Center for Religious Freedom of Freedom House 
concludes that Saudi textbooks taught in the public schools continue to reflect a 
curriculum that inculcates religious hatred towards those who do not follow Wahhabi 
teachings, and the descriptions of the “other”— Muslim deviants and infidels— in these 
textbooks for the 2006 academic year do not fit to the picture of moderation and tolerance 
presented by the Saudi ambassador to Washington and other Saudi officials.65  
After the bloody Balkans civil war between 1991 and 1995, one of the major 
concerns was removing offensive material from the textbooks.  This is being done by 
means of an agreement titled “the Agreement on Removal of Objectionable Material 
from the Textbooks.”66  
Madrassahs—Islamic educational centers—are argued to be potential recruiting 
pools for radical groups, especially in Pakistan. Although the majority of these 
madrassahs separate themselves from politics, some are controlled by the radical political 
parties who are opposed to General Pervez Musharraf, who is providing extensive 
support for the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. The World Bank estimates that there are 
10,000 madrassahs in Pakistan, and 15 to 20 percent of them are thought to provide some 
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military training67. These madrassahs are more a threat to the Pervez Musharraf regime 
rather than as a pool for the Al Qaeda network, because Al Qaeda is inclined not to trust 
nationalities other than Arabs, as was the case in Afghanistan during the Afghan War. 
The absence of Afghan members in their global network is another indicator of this 
fact.68 However, their location in loosely controlled territories of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan makes the Pakistani security force’s intervention difficult. 
E. OPERATIONAL TRAINING 
Operational training gives the trainees the skills to kill. Some of these skills are 
described in the mini manual of urban guerrilla: 
It is very important to learn how to drive a car, pilot a plane, handle a 
motor boat and a sailboat, understand mechanics, radio, telephone, 
electricity and have some knowledge of electronics techniques. It is also 
important to have knowledge of topographical information, to be able to 
determine one's position by instruments or other available resources, to 
calculate distances, make maps and plans, draw to scale, make timings, 
and work with an angle protractor, a compass, etc. A knowledge of 
chemistry, of color combination and of stamp-making, the mastery of the 
skills of calligraphy and the copying of letters, and other techniques are 
part of the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla, who is obliged to 
falsify documents in order to live within a society that he seeks to destroy. 
In the area of "makeshift" medicine, the urban guerrilla has the special role 
of being a doctor or understanding medicine, nursing, pharmacology, 
drugs, basic surgery and emergency first aid.69 
The operational learning should take place in locations with specific 
characteristics due to its content. The training camp should contain a shooting range, an 
area for sports activities, etc. Such places must be in remote areas in order not to be 
detected by security forces or in places where there are no security establishments at all. 
The Al Qaeda manual gives thirteen qualifications for a training camp, most of which are 
security related.70  
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F. LEARNING TERRORIST SYSTEMS  
Terrorist systems adapt to their very dynamic environment by means of a learning 
process at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. In planning operations, selecting 
targets, and applying new weapons or new technologies, terrorist groups must gather 
necessary strategic and tactical information, combine it with their and other systems’  
past experiences, store the information inside the system’s boundaries, and  
disseminate the information to the necessary levels.  
Brian A. Jackson and Horacio R. Trujillo call this process organizational learning 
and define it as “a process through which the members of the organization develop new 
knowledge about their actions and outcomes, share this knowledge throughout the 
organization, incorporate it into the routines of the organization, and store the knowledge 
in an organizational memory.”71 They suggest a four stage information processing model 
through which information must pass: acquisition, distribution, interpretation, and 
retention.72 
1. Acquisition 
The acquisition of the knowledge occurs in various ways, such as through the 
knowledge that the system inherits from their original leaders and ideologues, knowledge 
by direct experience, knowledge from external resources like other terrorist systems in 
the environment, and strategic learning actions.73 Terrorist systems study successful 
implementations of others’ actions, and simply imitate them. After Hezbollah used 
suicide bombings, other groups adopted them: Chechen rebels in 2000, Tamil Tigers in 
Sri Lanka in 1987, the Palestinian group Hamas in 1994, the PKK in Turkey in 1996, and 
Al-Qaeda with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and other 
attacks. Perhaps the most important form of knowledge transfer takes place through the 
migration of fighters from one operational theater to another. Afghanistan and Bosnia in 
the past, and Iraq, Chechnya and Somalia today are the places where global terrorists 
share their operational knowledge. 
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In terms of strategic learning, a document posted in a well-known Islamist 
message board called “Jihadi Iraq-Hopes and Risks” is worth noting. The document 
contained a detailed analysis of the weaknesses of the Western coalition in Iraq, 
recommended ‘painful strikes’ against the Spanish forces, and advised the Islamic 
resistance to make utmost use of upcoming Spanish elections in March of the next year.74 
On March 11, 2004, just before the elections, the Madrid bombings occurred, killing 192 
people and injuring 1600.  An Al Qaeda-affiliated group took responsibility, announcing 
that the plot was to punish the Spanish government for participating in the Western 
coalition in Iraq.75 The efforts that paved the way to Aum Shrinkiyo’s chemical attack on 
the Tokyo subway system is another example of the strategic learning process of terrorist 
systems. Thirty to 80 people were involved in Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical weapons 
program. They possessed the weapons at the end of a complex series of scientific 
research and acquisition programs, including international activities, and then they 
conducted an attack that caused a shift in threat assessments by transnational sub-state 
actors.76  
2. Distribution 
Terrorist systems disseminate information by either directly teaching it in their 
training activities or distributing it in the form of printed material. The more widely 
distributed the information across the system the less likely the information will be lost 
and the system’s learning capability will deteriorate.77 The Internet plays a central role in 
terms of terrorist information dissemination today because of its easy access and 
anonymous nature. The option of storing knowledge in physical form was not an 
accepted one in the past because of operation security concerns of the terrorist system. 
The preferred technique was directly including the information in their training programs 
and disseminating it through teaching. However, this form of retention of knowledge is 
                                                 
74 Brynjar Lia and Thomas Heghammer, “Jihadi Stratgic Studies: Alleged Al Qaeda Policy Study 
Preceding the Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,  27, 2004 p.355 
75 Gilles Tremlet, “We Bombed Madrid, says Al Qaeda Tape,”  14 March 2004, Observer  Guardian 
available at  http://observer.guardian.co.uk/waronterrorism/story/0,,1169143,00.html    
76 John V. Parachini, “The making of Aum Shinrikyo’s Chemical Weapons Program,” in The Making 
of a Terrorist vol. 2 Training ed James F. Forest ( Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006) p. 
277  
77 Parachini, p.279 
39 
more prone to deterioration; thus, storing knowledge in physical or virtual environments 
now is more popular. The use of the Internet by terrorist groups has enhanced their 
dissemination and retention capability. 
3. Interpretation  
Generally the information stored in terrorist manuals is not raw information but an 
interpreted version. The information has to be interpreted according to the frameworks of 
the system and then stored. For example, the reason each group employs violence varies 
from group to group in accord with their different interpretations. In one communiqué of 
the Red Army Faction in Germany the only way, according to them, is urban guerilla 
warfare: “the urban guerrilla is the logical consequence of the negation of parliamentary 
democracy long since perpetuated by its very own representatives; the only and inevitable 
response to emergency laws and rule of hand grenade [is] the readiness to fight with the 
same means the system has chosen to use.”78  On the other hand in an Al-Qaeda 
publication, the purpose of human targets is stated:  the Jews, Christians, anybody close 
to the Jewish and Christian governments such as Hosni Mubarak (Egypt’s President), and 
seculars are given priority respectively, “to stress the struggle of the faiths. Targeting 
Jews and Christians is a proof that it is a religious struggle.”79 
4. Retention 
Now the most preferred technique for preserving knowledge is printed materials.  
One of the most notorious training manuals for the Brazilian revolutionary terrorist 
groups in the 1970’s was Carlos Marighella’s “Mini Manual of the Urban Guerilla.” 
which inspired like-minded terrorist groups such as Red Brigades and the Red Army 
Faction. This manual gives how-to type of instructions about subjects varying from 
personal qualities of the urban guerrilla, weapons, logistics, tactics, executions, sabotage, 
bank assaults as a popular tactic, guerrilla security, to the seven sins that the guerrilla 
must avoid.80 
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The Green Book of the IRA is another example of information retention for next 
generations and other terrorist systems as a secondary effect. The Green Book begins 
with a section explaining the historical struggle for an independent Ireland and depicts 
England as an occupier and imperialist power. In other words, it defines the enemy 
largely in socialist terms and gives instructions about guerilla strategy, operation security, 
anti-interrogation techniques, and so-called court marshal procedures of the terrorist 
group. The detainees in prison stored their information about the interrogation techniques 
of the security forces and how they were arrested in order to help the other members of 
the organization avoid making the same mistakes. 
Al-Qaeda’s manual, Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants, Military 
Series is another example of information retention in printed form. The eighteen lessons 
include “general introduction,” necessary qualifications and characteristics for the 
members, counterfeit currency and forged documents, organization of military bases, 
apartments and other places, concealment, means of communication and transportation, 
training, and weapons (measures related to buying and transporting them), member 
safety, security plans, definition of special operations, espionage, assassinations using 
poisons and cold steel, torture methods, and prisons and detention centers. In the manual 
written by an experienced instructor of the Terrorist Group of Egypt before it merged 
with Al Qaeda,81 there are examples from the Prophet Mohammad era as well as 
examples from KGB and Mossad agents, showing the adaptive learning capability of the 
network. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Dave Grossman formulates the probability of a person to kill with the variables 
below: 
Probability of Personal Kill= (demands of authority) X (group absolution) X 
(total distance from victim) X (target attractiveness of victim) X (aggressive 
predisposition of killer)82. Each variable in the equation is also a product of independent 
sets of variables. The training process increases the values of each independent variable 
of the equation. A trainee turns into an obedient follower of the authority, is bonded to 
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the group, views victims demonized and more attractive to kill, and becomes technically 
skilled through the training process. The strategic acquisition of new knowledge and 
technology makes the group more likely to employ mass killings in its absolute form of 
using weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  
Increasing numbers of the captured terrorists in detainee camps or ordinary 
prisons throughout the world sparks a question in people’s mind: Is it possible to reverse 
this process and take these terrorists back to normal social life again? This is already 
being practiced by some countries in various forms such as Indonesia, Singapore, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Britain and planned to be implemented in Australia.83  
In Yemen Religious Dialogue Council (RDC), headed by Hamoud al-Hitar 
designed a program to convince suspected militants that carrying out violent actions in 
the name of Islam is not sanctioned by the Quran or the Sunna. It has since released 364 
suspected militants in six separate pardons, following their pledges to abstain from 
violence. Bin Laden's former bodyguard, al-Bahri, is one such graduate of the RDC‘s 
program.84 
The success of the program can be measured by the percentage of the terrorist that 
return their militant activities, but what percentage should be considered an acceptable 
threshold for success? There is always a risk for releasing the wrong people, but it is 
worth trying. Michael Taarnby argues “Perhaps there are other measures of success 
within this relatively new field of counter- terrorism. Judge al-Hittar has received a 
number of death threats . . . He currently lives under armed protection, an indication that 
someone is following his work and has drawn the conclusion that the soft-spoken cleric is 
a danger that should be eliminated”85 The time will show exact results of the program. As 
we discussed in the first chapter the solutions to wicked problems can not be judged as 
right or wrong but they should be treated as a hypothesis unless proven unsuccessful. 
Various countries, Yemen in particular are trying their own solutions for the time being. 
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Physical training camps are very vulnerable to kinetic attacks of security forces. 
Most of Al Qaeda and its affiliate camps around the world have already been destroyed. 
As a response, terrorist organizations has used  the Internet , especially for recruiting and 
training, as illustrated by internet communiqués among subjects who discuss in detailed 
knowledge about explosives, and web pages full of hatred. Terrorist training is mutating 
from a formal planned activity that is done in specific geographical places with specific 
techniques to self-service type by means of the Internet that provides all the equipment 
for turning a recruit into a terrorist. The next chapter will explore how terrorist 
organizations moved their training camps to the virtual world.  
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IV. THE VIRTUAL TRAINING CAMPS OF THE TERRORIST 
TRAINING SUBSYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The network that became “the Internet” started during the Cold War, when the 
U.S. Department of Defense was concerned about the vulnerability of its computer 
network to a nuclear attack. The basic idea was to decentralize the whole system by 
creating an interconnected web of computers. The Internet was designed so that every 
computer could communicate with every other computer. Starting with a few computer 
networks, the Internet expanded exponentially by adding private networks of businesses, 
educational and research institutions, and government organizations and agencies inside 
its boundary. On September 18, 2006, the global Internet community reached the number 
of 1,086,250,903; that is, about sixteen out of one hundred people around the world use 
the Internet.86 In certain regions of the globe the percentage is far higher; for example, in 
the United States 69.1 percent of the population uses the Internet.87  
The Internet has become a platform where people can meet from all over the 
world and exchange ideas. This was once thought to be an opportunity to spread the idea 
of democracy and freedom around the world. However, it has become a tool for 
mobilizing people around any kind of idea and movement. Professor Dorothy Denning 
points out that “groups of any size, from two to millions, can reach each other and use the 
Net to promote an agenda. Their members and followers can come from any geographical 
region on the Net, and they can attempt to influence foreign policy anywhere in the 
world.”88 
As John Arquilla states, “every opportunity comes with its own vulnerability.”89 
In the same way that nuclear power promised humanity an enormous source of energy, 
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but became a catastrophic weapon in the hand of human beings, the Internet is now being 
exploited by international terrorists, who are considered to be today’s most dangerous 
threat to global security. Gabriel Weimann notes that “in 1998, fewer than half of the 30 
groups that the U.S. State Department designates as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations’ 
(FTOs) had websites. But by the end of 1999, nearly all of them did.”90 
According to Weimann, the Internet is used by terrorists for various purposes 
such as data mining to determine targets and gather information about these targets, 
networking terrorists, recruiting and mobilizing the target audience, providing 
instructions in online manuals, planning and coordinating the attacks, fund raising, and 
attacking other rival terrorists.91  The focus of this chapter is terrorist use of the Internet 
for training purposes. 
B. WHY VIRTUAL TRAINING CAMPS? 
1. Result of Adaptation 
According to the White House’s progress report on the global war on terrorism, 
the United States, with the help of its allies and partners, killed or took into custody two 
thirds of the senior Al Qaeda leaders, operational managers and key facilitators, and 
made terror networks lose access to nearly $200 million.92 Despite these developments, 
Al Qaeda remains one of the most significant threats to the Western world in general and 
to U.S. national security in particular. 
The main reason for Al Qaeda’s resilience is its capability of adaptation to its 
hostile environment. Al Qaeda started with a hierarchical organization, but evolved over 
time and became a network of cells loosely affiliated with each other.93 Perhaps in time 
these cells will disappear due to counterterrorism measures, and Al Qaeda will become a 
leaderless resistance movement that has little or no organizational affiliation as a result of 
its adaptation strategies. Bruce Hoffman argues that “Al Qaeda’s resiliency and longevity  
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are predicated not on the total number of Jihadists that it might have in the past, but its 
continued ability to recruit, to mobilize and to animate both actual and would-be fighters, 
supporters, and sympathizers.”94  
 The Internet plays a great role in Al Qaeda’s adaptation strategy, as the 9/11 
report concludes: 
 The emergence of [the] World Wide Web has given terrorists a much 
easier means of acquiring information and exercising command and 
control over their operations. The operational leader of the 9/11 
conspiracy, Mohammed Atta, went online from Hamburg, Germany to 
research U.S flight schools. Targets of intelligence collection have become 
more sophisticated. These changes have made surveillance and threat 
warning more difficult.95 
Terrorist websites, discussion forums, news, and multimedia blogs provide outlets 
for terrorist organizations to distribute their materials. While some designated terrorist 
websites can be monitored or removed, the material remains available online at other 
platforms. In order to disseminate material to large numbers and store it, terrorists no 
longer need a website. They can do it by means of peer to peer file sharing programs. The 
new file sharing technologies and programs are successful in providing an adequate hard 
drive open to file sharing.  
2. New Opportunities 
Due to their extremist beliefs and values, terrorists have to maintain their 
anonymity to exist, and to operate in social environments that may not agree with their 
particular ideologies or activities. The Internet, for that reason, offers anonymity and easy 
access from nearly anywhere in the world, with the ability to post messages, exchange e-
mails, upload and download information, and disappear into cyberspace. According to 
Gabriel Weimann, the Internet offers terrorists the following advantages: 
• Easy access 
• Little or no regulation, censorship, or other forms of government control 
• Potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world 
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• Anonymity of communication 
• Fast flow of information 
• Interactivity 
• Inexpensive development and maintenance of a Web presence 
• A multimedia environment (the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and 
video and to allow users to download films, songs books, posters, and so forth) 
• The ability to shape coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly 
use the Internet as a source for stories.96 
As a result of these advantages terrorist organizations use the Internet for various 
purposes such as:  
• As an instrument in their terrorist actions like data mining for possible targets, 
planning, and coordination 
• Recruitment and mobilization  
• Fundraising 
• Communication with their target audience and the government in forms of 
propaganda and communiqués  
• Motivational and operational training. 
• Attacking an opponent’s vulnerable technology systems in the form of cyber 
terrorism. 
Without recruits the terrorist organization cannot survive. The recruitment and 
training strategy of terrorist networks (that of Al Qaeda in particular) is, today, beyond 
classic sign up and train strategy. Instead, they try to inspire people who are close to their 
ideology around the globe, and create franchise organizations or individuals to attack 
Western, particularly American, targets. In this franchising strategy adapted from the 
business world, another business strategy, advertising, is used to attract new individuals 
or groups close to their ideology. As Bruce Hoffmann points out, “despite the multiplicity 
and diversity of terrorist websites, they share a number of key characteristics in common. 
These sites are often notable for their colorful, well-designed and visually arresting 
graphic content. In this respect, they seem designed particularly to appeal to a computer 
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savvy, media-saturated, video game addicted generation.”97 The internet is the main 
instrument for the modern terrorist networks for recruitment and training.98  
The online manual of al Qaeda, “Al Battar,” addresses the would-be terrorists: 
“Oh Mujahid brother, in order to join the great training camps you don’t have to travel to 
other lands. Alone, in your home or with a group of your brothers, you too can begin to 
execute the training program. You can all join the Al Battar training camp.”99 This call 
also should be a wake up call for counterterrorism experts to focus on the use of new 
technologies in terrorism, especially for recruiting and the training purposes. 
Although the online manual of Al Qaeda offers its own material, the Internet is 
full of material which motivates an individual to become a terrorist, and once he or she 
has made up his or her mind, he or she can reach a lot of how-to type material needed to 
carry out an attack. 
C. MOTIVATIONAL TRAINING ON THE NET 
We defined motivational training as the process that gives individuals the will to 
kill by creating a sense of hatred and an “us versus them” mindset. The official websites 
of the terrorist organizations already serve that purpose and are known and monitored by 
official or unofficial watch groups.  A thorough and extensive scan of the Internet from 
2003-2005 showed that more than 4,300 Web sites serving terrorists and their 
supporters.100 On the other hand, innocent Internet firms whose first consideration is 
profit are largely used by terrorist organizations for disseminating their materials in the 
form of documents or multimedia products.  
The video sharing web sites like You Tube, Google video or Yahoo videos 
become an arena where two opposite sides fight with their videos. Although there are 
some restrictions for posting videos, a lot of terrorist content is available on the Net. The 
target audiences of these videos is not only sympathizers but also Web surfers who have 
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nothing to do with current conflicts, but are seen as potential supporters or even potential 
militants of the future. For example, You Tube, which is the largest video sharing site on 
the Net, contains a lot of propaganda videos of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, PKK, 
FARC, ETA, IRA, and LTTE. 
You Tube, whose slogan is “broadcast yourself,” also gives the opportunity to 
viewers to post their comments about the videos. The comments, that anyone can write 
anything in any language without any restrictions, are also sources that breed hatred in 
the bones of the people who watch the videos, creating or empowering the sense of “us 
versus them.” The individual postings of private videos either shot by a private in the 
Israeli, American or British Army, which their commanders have no knowledge of and 
cannot prevent, or deliberately prepared terrorist attack videos, or beheading scenes 
breeds hatred on both sides. As Gabriel Weimann points out, these individual postings of 
pictures or videos are one of the sources of the mainstream media. These postings, which 
are also primary sources for the conflict, are in turn publicized by popular satellite TV 
networks or popular newspaper commentaries, and become secondary propaganda 
material for terrorist groups.101 
The U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld quoted Ayman Al Zawahiri, the 
number two man in Al Qaeda, in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations: 
“More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a 
media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims,” and admitted that “[t]oday 
we're engaged in the first war in history -- unconventional and irregular as it may be -- in 
an era of: e-mails, blogs, cell phones, blackberries, instant messaging, digital cameras, a 
global Internet with no inhibitions, hand-held video cameras, talk radio, 24-hour news 
broadcasts, satellite television. There's never been a war fought in this environment 
before.”102  
The Internet Salafi Jihadists have responded quickly to the February 17 address of 
the Defense Secretary, using it as a weapon in their sophisticated propaganda war to 
motivate their supporters. The Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) posted on the al- 
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Ghorabaa forum on February 19 a declaration celebrating this now-acknowledged media 
superiority over the U.S. military. The declaration calls for individuals skilled at 
photography by mobile phone and video camera to spy on the enemy and expose his 
ignominy and shame, for them to publish to the masses with the aim of striking the 
enemy in images, audio, statements, poetry, flash and so on . . . which exposes the real 
state of affairs, for this is the greatest weak spot.103 
D. RECRUITMENT ON THE NET 
Terrorist message boards become new recruitment centers of terrorist 
organizations. The recruiter and the volunteer meet in the message boards on the Net, and 
after a series of confidence tests, in case of infiltration by counterterrorism agents, the 
volunteer is accepted into the organization. The first preference of the organizations is for 
recruits who already possess “terrorist” skills or people who have other advantageous 
abilities for terrorist attacks. On March 17, 2005, a member of a Jihadist Internet forum 
posted a message on a website seeking volunteers to register as mujahideen “volunteers 
for jihad from Arab countries, to break the supply of the American enemy.” A member 
by the name Akho [Brother] Hadla, lists various skills required to become a mujahideen 
fighter, including: loyalty, knowledge of explosives and disguises, and intelligence 
information.”104 In addition, the message calls upon ”those who know how to draw up 
[sketch] plans, [to] send me a map of your town in a special [private] message and give 
the places where the Americans, the Israelis, the Jews or the Christians are located.”105 
E. OPERATIONAL TRAINING ON THE NET 
Terrorist web sites offer operational training material to recruits who want to train 
themselves on their own. The terrorist websites either provide the material in their own 
Web pages or they direct people to sites where materials are available. The most 
important source for this type of material is the online training camp of Al Qaeda, “Al 
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Battar.” In the seventh issue of the online manual, Abu Hajir Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who 
identified himself as a head of Jihad in Arabian Peninsula, and killed by the Saudi 
security forces later, suggests in his article a coordinated effort to destabilize Western 
interests in the Islamic world by attacking their financial, diplomatic and military targets. 
The author is surprisingly pragmatic, unlike the other ideologically-burdened rhetoric 
statements of high ranking Al Qaeda members. He advises restraint when targeting 
ideological or religious opponents, as doing so may produce a backlash from the local 
population. Furthermore, the text details operations against economic targets, with the 
aim of disrupting the "air of stability" necessary for trade and Western business interests 
to succeed. Also, the article provides a number of insights into the tactics and planning of 
terrorist operations in urban environments.106 
The latter issues of “Al Battar” provide further tactical and technical information 
for would-be Jihadists. The tenth issue focuses on kidnapping, and analyzes kidnapping 
operations under the following headings: reasons for detaining one or more individuals 
by an enemy, requirements needed in forming a kidnapping group, the definition of 
kidnapping, types of kidnapping, stages of public kidnapping, and security measures for 
public kidnapping, and how to deal with the hostages in a kidnapping operations.107 In 
the correspondence section the publication gives two pieces of advice to their supporters, 
which is worth noting in terms of revealing the new recruiting and training strategy of the 
terrorist network: 
To all the brothers who inquired on how to join the camp, following are 
brief instructions. Use the Al Battar training instructions and keep 
exercising. Try to obtain a firearm (i.e. Kalashnikov), and practice 
shooting and handling the weapon in the wilderness. In the name of God, 
try forming a cell or a group, through which you can work on fighting the 
blasphemers, until you get the chance to join the Mujahideen brothers in 
Al-Haramain country [Saudi Arabia].To all the brothers who inquired on 
explosives and how to get them, we say: Manufacturing explosives is not 
as hard as the enemies of God are projecting it to be. They are doing so, in 
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order to keep the young generation from using this effective and scary 
device against them. When the time is right, we shall provide training on 
how to make/assemble explosive materials, in the Al Battar magazine, 
under the "sword of victory" section. Should you be in a hurry to obtain 
this information, you may use the Jihad Encyclopedia as a reference.108 
The thirteenth issue gives instructions about how to use an RPG 7 rocket 
propelled grenade weapon in various positions (standing, kneeling, lying down, and from 
fox holes), after praising the Jihad against the infidels.109 The seventeenth issue focuses 
on pistols; the eighteenth on the 9X18mm “MAKAROV” pistol with illustrations and 
detailed information on its weight, range, parts, operating mode, loading and unloading, 
cleaning and maintenance, the characteristics and disadvantages of automatic pistols, etc. 
The twentieth issue focuses on training in topography. 
There are many websites and discussion forums protected by passwords that 
provide various instructions about topics ranging from practical methods of preparing 
explosives to first aid instructions for the mujahidat (women Jihadists) to help their 
fellow mujahideen. SITE institute, a non-profit organization that watches the Jihadist 
websites and discussion forums, provides an extended list of examples of technical and 
tactical instructions from terrorist websites:   
• Instructions for the extraction and preparation of chloride explosive 
• Preparing poisonous gases using simple substances: Botulinum toxin or the rotten 
meat poison manuals for the highly potent liquid explosive, Astrolite 
• An alternate strategy for suicide bombers so as to avoid the consequence of 
failure when they’re fired upon by enemy forces 
• A manual instructing in the use of letter and parcel bomb  
• A video manual for the preparation of black powder for explosives  
• Strategies to circumvent the joint IED neutralizer 
• A method for damaging oil pipelines via the application of physical pressure 
• A video manual for the construction of an IED detonator 
• Manual for making rocket propellant  
• A video instruction manual for the planting and dismantling of mines 
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• Guide for modifying a cellular phone for use as a remote explosive detonator  
• A manual instructing in the use of Clostridium microbe and Clostridium 
Botulinum toxin as biological weapons 
• A manual instructing in the use of “plague” as a biological weapon  
• An instructional video for the preparation of nitroglycerin 
• A video manual for creating Nitric Acid Fulminate  
• An instructional video for preparation of Mercury Fulminate in explosives 
• An instructional video for preparation of Ammonium Nitrate in explosives  
• A video guide for preparing RDX explosives 
• A manual for several varieties of explosives and charges - history, instructions, 
and applications 
• The Jihadi nuclear bomb and methods of nuclear enrichment 
• Video instruction for making Sijjeel - an improvised hand-thrown charge against 
vehicles and personnel 
• An illustrated course in booby trapping - a presentation for making buried 
explosive charges and car bombs110 
The complexity of the instructions and the ambition for obtaining knowledge 
about weapons of mass destruction reveal that terrorist organizations still pose a great 
threat to the United States and its allies. 
F. STRATEGIC LEARNING THROUGH THE NET 
One of the basic characteristics of terrorist web sites and discussion boards is their 
contribution to the adaptation of the terrorist network to its turbulent environment by 
means of strategic learning. Acquisition of knowledge, its interpretation, distribution, and 
retention are necessary conditions for learning systems. The Internet provides all four of 
these conditions for terrorists. 
First, the Internet is like a giant library where you can reach millions of 
documents, multimedia files, and software. For acquiring any type of information, user-
friendly search engines provide a great opportunity. Furthermore, terrorist systems do not 
need to struggle to find any particular information. All the information is already 
available. 
Discussion forums and message boards are the virtual places where pieces of 
information are interpreted or framed according to the system’s standards before reaching 
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the customers. The comments of top figures of an organization about a controversial 
subject, a failure of the organization, a message from an opposite side all pass through the 
interpretation filter first and are then distributed by means of Internet messages by 
various means on the network. The interpretation function of the terrorist networks makes 
strategic information operations difficult for counterterrorism agencies. 
One can reach terrorist information from different sources. The proliferation of 
websites and the peer-to-peer file sharing programs helps keep information inside the 
organization for future use. The terrorist internet sites, message boards, e-mail groups, 
and discussion forums are monitored by intelligence agencies, private research 
organizations, watchdogs, and some responsible ordinary citizens. The recent 
introduction of new broadband Internet technology to the world has facilitated new usage 
areas. This new technology is very vulnerable to terrorist exploitation, and has not yet 
caught enough attention both from scholars and law enforcement agencies. This new 
opportunity for terrorists and vulnerability for the civilized world is managed by “peer-to-
peer” computer networks. Although the first generation of computer networks were peer-
to peer-networks of a few computers, with the proliferation of Internet usage, much larger 
and more centralized server-based networks replaced them. 
G. NEW TECHNOLOGIES NEW VULNERABILITIES 
Recent estimates peg the share of peer-to-peer traffic out of the overall Internet 
backbone traffic volume to be somewhere between 40% and 60%. The total number of 
users is in the order of hundreds of millions.111 Obviously part of the success is based on 
the fact that peer-to-peer (P2P) is an excellent way to circumvent copyright laws and 
distribute illegal material. All one needs for participating a P2P network is IP 
connectivity. In this aspect peer-to-peer applications could be classified as self-
organizing or self-sufficient.112 The basic idea of P2P systems is that the system seeks 
and identifies more powerful computers with larger bandwidth within the system as super 
nodes or servers in a dynamic nature. The Internet, once controlled by servers, is now 
becoming a “complex adaptive system” that regulates itself. 
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P2P is a way of structuring distributed applications such that the individual nodes 
have symmetric roles. Rather than being divided into clients and servers each with quite 
distinct roles (such as Web clients vs. Web servers), in P2P applications a node may act 
as both a client and a server. P2P systems are in general deployable in an ad-hoc fashion, 
without requiring centralized management or control. They can be highly autonomous, 
and can lend themselves to anonymity.113 Various P2P software programs create a 
network through which all clients join together dynamically to help each other route 
traffic and store information.  
The nodes providing the actual service are thus mainly located in ordinary 
Internet users’ homes, rather than in server hotels, where the majority of traditional 
WWW, e-mail or FTP servers are run and are hosted. There is also no authority assigned 
with a large portion of the infrastructure, since everything is distributed among hundreds 
or thousands or millions of individuals. This makes the attempts to control the systems 
very challenging. Also, like any self organizing network topology, it is very resilient 
against failures in parts of the system.114 The classic HTTP-based and P2P-based 
networks are illustrated below.115 
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Figure 5 Classic HTTP-based and P2P Based Internet Structure 
 
P2P networks are also used for making VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocols) 
calls. VoIP is a technology that allows people to make phone calls through the public 
Internet rather than a traditional public switched telephone network, and predicted that 
VoIP will account for approximately 75% of world voice services by 2007.116 The use of 
VoIP has made it much easier to achieve anonymity in voice communications, especially 
when VoIP calls are made between computers. This is because VoIP calls between peer 
computers have no phone numbers associated with them, and they could easily be 
protected by end-to-end encryption to achieve anonymity. The VoIP system basically 
works as follows: 
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Figure 6 Illustration of Voice over Internet Protocols (VoIP) System 
 
The fact that the VoIP system bypasses satellite phone systems used for delivering 
voice communications, and its facilitation of encryption from caller to called are 
challenges for monitoring the VoIP calls.  But the study of three scholars at George 
Mason University demonstrates that it is possible to track VoIP calls that are at least 90 
seconds long.117 
Although the websites of terrorist organizations are sometimes shut down by 
governments or Internet service providers, the same materials become available in 
another site later, if not downloaded to hard disks of interested people. P2P provides a 
way for individuals to search and download files from a peer computer without any need 
for a Web page. The decentralization provided by P2P technology is obviously a 
disadvantage for counterterrorism agencies, but also can be an advantage for infiltrating 
into terrorist networks. 
                                                 




While people of good will are  debating about civil rights and preserving privacy, 
a lot of evil-minded people are communicating, propagating, planning, fundraising, 
sharing information, and discussing how they can harm innocent people. Obviously the 
Internet is a great power for global communication and global economy, but power 
without control can be dangerous. 
Eliminating tangibles in this training subsystem is easier. Terrorist training camps 
all over the world are being destroyed. Countries that harbor terrorism are coerced by the 
international community (i.e., Syria, Iran). Bank accounts that fund training camps are 
frozen. Unstable regions of the world (i.e. Somalia and Afghanistan) that are potential 
safe havens for terrorist camps have regional or global efforts aimed at stabilization. 
The intangibles like countering terrorist ideologies and denying exponential 
proliferation of terrorist knowledge are harder. The former is difficult because inherently 
persuading people is harder than coercing them and the later is difficult because 
democratic countries are reluctant to place restrictions on what people can read and share 
with others.  
As discussed throughout the chapter, the internet becomes a virtual safe haven for 
terrorist in terms of terrorist training. According to White House’s National Strategy for 
combating terrorism: 
The Internet provides an inexpensive, anonymous, geographically 
unbounded, and largely unregulated virtual haven for terrorists. Our 
enemies use the Internet to develop and disseminate propaganda, recruit 
new members, raise and transfer funds, train members on weapons use and 
tactics, and plan operations. Terrorist organizations can use virtual safe 
havens based anywhere in the world, regardless of where their members or 
operatives are located. Use of the Internet, however, creates opportunities 
for us to exploit. To counter terrorist use of the Internet as a virtual 
sanctuary, we will discredit terrorist propaganda by promoting truthful and 
peaceful messages. We will seek ultimately to deny the Internet to the 
terrorists as an effective safe haven for their propaganda, proselytizing, 
recruitment, fundraising, training, and operational planning.118  
Although it is very difficult to control all the content of the internet it is not free 
from censorship. According to reporters of San Frontiers, 45 countries restrict their 
                                                 
118 White House, “America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” September 2006 available 
at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.htm accessed on 10 November 2006   
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citizens’ access to the internet, typically by forcing them to subscribe to a state-run 
internet service provider, which may filter out objectionable sites. Authoritarian regimes 
recognize the benefits of the internet to economic growth, but at the same time feel 
threatened by the unprecedented degree of freedom of speech.119” Denying terrorists 
internet use for their various purposes requires a tight coordination and collaboration 
among the countries. Although achieved by countries, terrorists find ways to publish their 
same site through another country’s web hosting service providers and servers.  
Potential use of peer-to-peer networks by terrorists has to be considered by the 
counter terrorism authorities. Dynamic adaptive nature of terrorist systems will make 
them seek other ways in case their web presence is eliminated. Peer-to-peer internet 
networks, which are now largely used for illegal sharing of copyrighted material, seems 
to be terrorist’s new trend. Thus counter terrorism agencies must find ways to monitor 
each peer computer in the system before the threat becomes greater. 
Censorship often creates a contradictory argument in democratic societies. Thus 
solutions that will be embraced by the general public have to be sought. The author 
believes that the selective elimination of the terrorist websites is necessary for further 
success in war on terrorism to prevent the terrorist systems from training their 
prospective militants in virtual training camps. This effort must be coordinated and done 
systematically to prevent waste of time and efforts. The next chapter demonstrates three 
steps of this elimination strategy in terrorist network PKK case study of its website 
presence. 
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V. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF A TERRORIST 
NETWORK’S WEBSITES TO IDENTIFY POINTS OF 
VULNERABILITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On 12 September 2006, a bomb blast at a children’s park in Diyarbakir, Turkey 
killed eleven and wounded seventeen people, seven of whom were children. After the 
incident, a PKK-linked website published a news story indicating that a new radical 
group called Turkish Revenge Brigades took responsibility for the attack. The “new” 
group called the Turkish Revenge Brigades was portrayed by the PKK website as 
retaliating to an incident in which a Turkish soldier had been killed in a clash between 
Turkish Security Forces and PKK terrorists. In the story there were also pictures of the 
bomb’s detonation system, and statements alleging that these pictures were taken from 
the website of the Turkish Revenge Brigade (TRB), where the TRB’s communiqué of 
responsibility could allegedly be found. The communiqué was obviously designed to 
provoke hatred between Kurds and Turks saying that “kill 10 Kurds in Diyarbakir for 
every Turk killed.” The incident sparked a lot of violent street demonstrations in 
southeastern region of Turkey and major cities like Istanbul with the provocations of the 
PKK terrorists and their media supporters. 
When the story was first published on the PKK website, there was no link to the 
alleged website in which the communiqué of responsibility was published. One day later, 
the story was republished with an URL address to the website 
(http://www.turkintikantugayi.8m.com). However, people who entered this site through 
the link saw the responsibility communiqué and frog images in the places of IED system 
photographs, which the PKK site alleged that they took from turkintikantugayi.8m.com. 
The reason why frog pictures appeared in the site was that the website did not have 
enough capacity to store the IED system pictures that were published in the PKK’s news 
story. PKK terrorist network already had the pictures before bombing. This was their 
very deliberate psychological campaign to take the advantage of the incident. However it 
was prepared very unskillfully. The bombers, story makers, website designers, and the 
provocateurs all proved to be the same group. 
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Investigations later showed that the bomb was PKK’s device that exploded 
prematurely before it was planted next to a big police station very close to the children’s 
park.120 The incident was an illustration of how a modern terrorist group uses the 
internet. Who was the group that killed seven children and attempted to misinform the 
people using black propaganda to provoke ethnic hatred? What were their aims? It is 
useful to describe the group in the context of Turkey’s terrorism experiences in its 72 
year history. 
Modern Turkey, since its foundation in 1923, has faced four waves of terrorism. 
The first wave of terrorism hit Turkey as well as other European countries, when Marxist 
students took up arms to fight the regime in late 1960s. In 1971, the Turkish military 
seized power for a short time, restored order and left the government to the civilians 
again. Most of the terrorist leaders were killed, arrested, or left the country for Europe or 
other parts of the Middle East. 
The second wave of terrorism began in 1974, when the most of the terrorist 
leaders were released from prisons due to a politically motivated amnesty granted by the 
government of the day.121 These terrorists went back to work again launching urban 
terrorism to a degree that Turkey had never seen before. While Marxist terrorists were 
targeting law enforcement personnel, conservative politicians, businessman, and 
uncooperative citizens, ultranationalist groups also took up arms and began attacking the 
Marxists as well as those suspected of aiding them. 
In the meantime, a terrorist group from Lebanon called the Armenian Secret 
Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was assassinating Turkish diplomats and 
their families all over the World.122 By 1980, this spiral of terror led to a chaotic situation 
when the daily body count was sometimes dozens, totaling around five thousand for the 
period between 1975 and 1980.123 Turkish military seized power again in a bloodless 
intervention 12 September, 1980 and restored the order with countrywide marshal law.  
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1. Turkey’s PKK Problem 
On August 15, 1984, almost eight months after Turkey returned to democracy 
again, a small group of Kurdish separatists began to attack Turkish military outposts in 
the Southeastern region of the country. The separatist terrorist group, which called 
themselves the Kurdish Workers Party, commonly known as PKK, engaged massive 
terrorism and rural insurgency campaign which has resulted in more than 30,000 
fatalities, mostly terrorists, civilian ethnically Kurdish citizens, civil servants, security 
forces and anti-PKK village guards.124  
Terrorist organization PKK was founded by Abdullah Ocalan, who was born in 
1948. He studied political science in Ankara University where he became a Maoist. By 
1973 he had organized a Maoist group whose goal was socialist revolution in Turkey. 
After years of indoctrination and recruiting, the PKK terror network was formally 
established on 7 November 1978. Since then, PKK has been using its terrorism campaign 
to support its political goal of building a Maoist Kurdish state in the areas of Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria. As a result of the successful military operations against the PKK and 
determined behavior of Turkish Government against the countries that supported the 
organization, Ocalan was arrested by the Turkish Special Forces in Nairobi after 
reportedly following a tip from American intelligence.125 Although the capture of Ocalan 
caused the terrorist network to loose support for its armed campaign, the group 
reorganized itself in the power vacuum areas of North of Iraq and began its intensive 
terrorist campaign in August 2004.126  
As the other modern terrorist organizations, the resilience of PKK comes from the 
adaptive strategies that the organization implemented through almost thirty years. The 
first adaptive strategy of PKK was declaring “so-called unilateral ceasefires” when the 
Turkish military operations intensified and hurt the infrastructure of the terrorist network. 
These announcements have never been accepted by the Turkish authorities for two main 
reasons. The first reason is that the terrorist network is not a main actor in international 
                                                 
124United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country 
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arena and can not use terms like “ceasefire,” that connotes some legal status. The second 
reason is to prevent them from disguising their weakness from their support base in times 
of inaction, because terrorist systems have to maintain a minimum level of violence in 
order not to be seen as weak in the eyes of their support base. 
The last so-called “ceasefire,” or time period between terrorist campaigns ended, 
in 2004, which was declared after the arrest of its ringleader in 1999.127 At times of 
inaction, the terrorist organization consolidated its power in the uncontrolled areas of 
North of Iraq, and resumed its terrorist attacks. PKK, again, announced recently that it 
stopped its terrorism campaign when coordination efforts of Turkey with the US 
intensified to make the terrorist organization lay down its arms unconditionally. In this 
regard, retired US Air Force General Joseph Ralston recently appointed as Special U.S. 
Envoy for Countering the PKK. General Ralston states the United States position toward 
PKK issue as following: “the U.S. has supported Turkey in its war on the PKK for a long 
time.  The United States declared the PKK as a terrorist organization almost ten years ago 
in 1997.  The United States was instrumental in getting the European Union to finally 
declare the PKK as a terrorist organization.  There is no question that the United States is 
far more focused on terror today than it was ten years ago . . .  [and] the reason the United 
States asked me to take this job was to come and have someone that can focus almost 
full-time on this issue.”128 
The second adaptive strategy of PKK terror network is imitating other terrorist 
organization’s successful tactics. Suicide attacks, hunger strikes in prisons and prison 
revolts were some the tactics that adopted from the other revolutionary terrorist 
organizations. Ocalan urged his terrorists to imitate Hamas in 1996 but the persuasion 
tactics of the bombers were a little bit different from that of Hamas. Rosemarie Skaine 
explains PKK’s tactics: “On October 25, 1996 Turkan Adiyaman, [a female terrorist of 
PKK], was shot by her own group, [because] she had refused to volunteer for suicide  
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bombing. She was shot in front of Leila Kaplan [another female PKK terrorist] as an 
example of the fate that befalls shirkers. Kaplan, who was 17 years old, then performed 
the bombing.”129   
The third adaptive strategy of PKK terrorist network has been to change its name 
periodically because different names enable them to escape from the international 
pressure that puts the network on designated terrorist lists, and second, deceive the 
international community about its violent side. It attempts to give the impression that the 
main terrorist group, PKK does not use violence. Since its foundation, the organization 
has been operating with the names of “PKK,” “Kongra/GEL,” “KADEK,” “HPG,” 
“TAK,” “KKK,” and “PJAK (Iranian branch).”130 TAK (Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan, 
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks in English), for example, engaged a bombing campaign in the 
big cities like Istanbul and recreation centers of coastal Turkey.131 The first attack of 
TAK was on August 2004 and this date coincides with the announcement that PKK 
would begin its terrorism campaign again after five years of inaction, demonstrating that 
TAK is a subordinate group of PKK terror network directed by the organization’s 
hierarchical leadership. 
The fourth strategy of the terrorist network is its technological adaptation. PKK is, 
perhaps, the first terrorist network that has a private satellite TV by which they can 
mobilize people with extensive propaganda on a 24/7 basis. The Roj TV station, a 
television station of PKK, has been banned in the UK and France, but it is still 
broadcasting from Denmark, despite the Turkish Government’s efforts to stop it.132 
B. OPERATIONAL TRAINING IN PKK 
The operational training is given to PKK recruits in the terrorist training camps in 
the north of Iraq specifically in Kandil Mountain, a 3,500 meters mountain that straddles 
along the Iranian Border of Iraq and is located 100 kilometers from the Turkish Border. 
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On the southern flank of the mountain the PJAK, the Iranian branch of PKK is located. 
Communication is facilitated through short range radio devices according to James 
Brandon of the Jamestown Foundation.133 He depicts the camp: 
 PKK operates at Mount Qandil more as a mini-state rather than a simple 
"training camp." While weapons training does take place and forms an 
important part of training for new recruits, the PKK puts great emphasis 
on ideological training. Education in Kurdish history, culture and politics 
aims to create dedication to the Kurdish cause with loyalty to Abdullah 
Ocalan. At the same time, many PKK members are middle-aged and have 
been in the camp since 1999, or even earlier. The camp is purposely 
situated far from the frontlines and its primary role is to act as a safe haven 
for Turkish Kurds. The sense of lethargy that pervades the camp comes 
from the fact that the PKK's leader is still Abdullah Ocalan who, despite 
being in prison, aims to micromanage the movement.134 
 
From the photographs that are posted on the PKK websites, it is seen that small 
arms training, guerilla tactics, and the ideological training constitutes most of the training 
program. In the PKK’s main website (pkk.org), one of the trainers writes that their 
training program in the training camp includes self criticism of their past tactics, Ocalan’s 
so called, “Democratic ecologic and gender free socialist paradigm,” and alleges that this 
new paradigm is the only alternative against the hegemonic capitalist system.135 The 
emphasis on the ideological training in the program demonstrates that their first priority 
is creating robust indoctrinated ideologically devoted terrorists and then giving 
operational skills to kill. 
According to Brandon, Internet connection is available from a few computers 
through satellite uplinks in the camp. Satellite TV is not the only way they can make their 
propaganda, transmit their massages, mobilize their people and motivationally train and 
sustain the motivational commitment among its members. The Internet is largely used by 
PKK terrorist network for these purposes. As observed by, a political science professor at 
Concordia University “when Turkish forces arrested Ocalan, Kurds around the world 
responded with demonstrations within a matter of hours.” He attributed the swift action in 
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part to the Internet and web. “They responded more quickly than governments did to his 
arrest,”136The systematic use of internet by PKK for motivational training will be the 
main focus in rest of the chapter. 
C. MOTIVATIONAL TRAINING THROUGH NET  
1. Dataset 
 1 Web address Language Content Links Design
 2 http://www.rojaciwan.com Kurdish Turkish 
Discussion Forum, 



























 5 http://www.pajk-online.com Turkish Terrorist Memoirs, Women Studies 
2,3,4,6,7,8,10,14,15
,16,17,20,23 3 
 6 http://www.kongra-gel.com can not be reached None none none 






Biased news blog 2,8,10,11,14,16,17,18,19,20,22,32,33 3 
 8 http://www.gundemimiz.com Turkish Biased news blog 9 3 
 9 http://www.cewlik.net Turkish Kurdish 
Discussion forums, 
Biased News blog none 2 





Intellectual editorials 2,8,11,12,13,20 3 








Books, photos and 
life story of Ocalan none 3 
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 13 http://www.amigra.org Turkish culture literature and arts publication 8,10,15,16,17,22 2 
 14 http://www.denge-mezopotamya.com Kurdish Biased news none 3 
 15 http://www.roj.tv Turkish, Kurdish TV channel's website none 3 
 16 http://www.azadiyawelat.com Kurdish Online newspaper none 3 
 17 http://www.firatnews.com Turkish Biased news agency none 3 
 18 http://www.rojev.com Kurdish Biased news none 3 





 20 http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.com/ Turkish Biased news none 3 






Propaganda 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,15,22,23 2 
 22 http://www.diclehaber.com/ Turkish Biased news agency none 3 
 23 http://www.serxwebun.com Turkish Designated publication of PKK none 1 
 24 http://www.pjak.com Farsi PKK’s Iranian branch none 2 






 26 http://www.gerila-online.net Turkish Propaganda and Communiqués 
2,3,4,5,10,12,15,16,
17,24,28 3 
 27 http://www.sehid.com Turkish Biographies of dead terrorists none 3 







of confederation of 
Kurdish Associations
8,16,18,21 1 
 29 http://www.kurder.dk Turkish Danish Biased news 25 1 
 30 http://www.welatparez.com Turkish Site of a faction from PKK none 3 















Site of an 
international 
campaign for freeing 
Ocalan 
7,15,34, 2 
 33 http://www.flash-bulletin.de Turkish Biased news  none 2 




 35 http://www.cmg-team.com Turkish Kurdish 
Kurdish hacker 
group's site none 2 
 36 http://rastibini.blogspot.com English Biased news blog 3,4,6,7,19,27,33, 3 
 37 http://www.nadir.org German Discussion forum none 1 
 38 http://www.ciwanenazad.rojaciwan.com. 
Turkish 
Kurdish 
Online publication of 
PKK’s youth branch none 3 
Table 2 List of PKK Websites 
 
The first two columns are the URL of the websites with a number attached to it. 
The numbers left hand side of the URLs also represents the websites. The third column is 
the languages in which the websites are published. The forth column shows the main 
content of the web sites. The fifth column shows the links from this particular row’s URL 
to the other sites. The sixth column shows the design quality of the websites in a three 
number scale. For example the website http://www.gundemimiz.com in the 8th row is being 
published in Turkish. It contains news sympathetic to the terrorist network and has a 
hyperlink to http://www.cewlik.net in the 9th row. It is professionally designed, has 
multimedia content and colorful view, thus it is graded 3 in terms of design quality.  
2. Content Analysis of PKK Websites 
The content of these 37 websites generally include: the history of the 
organization, biographies of its leaders and its killed terrorists, information on the 
political aims of the terrorist network, the maps of  so-called free Kurdistan, an intensive 
informative campaign about the Kurdish ethnicity, history, language, and culture. They 
claim that Kurds are the oldest people of the region beginning from Sumerian era to 
create and enforce identity, based on ethnicity. 
PKK websites avoid the organization’s violent record and basically highlight 
positive issues like freedom of speech, democratization, ecology, and its imprisoned 
ringleader. They aim at Western audiences, who are sensitive to these norms in order to 
provoke sympathy in democratic societies. 
The websites exaggerate the casualties of the security forces and hide their losses 
in order to encourage sympathizers, and make calls to the youngsters, not to sign up for 
the Turkish Armed Forces. 
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The main reason for publishing the sites in eight different languages, especially 
European languages, is to reach the second or third generation of ethnically Kurdish 
immigrants in these countries who can not speak either Kurdish or Turkish. Turkish is so 
popular because it is a common language even for the Kurdish speaking people who do 
not understand each other due to their dialect differences. Arabic and Farsi are used to 
reach the Kurdish population living in Syria and Iran. 
The web site named “pajkonline.com” aims at the women who were mostly used 
in suicide bombings in the past. Abdullah Ocalan had urged his militants to imitate 
Hamas militants by becoming human bombs in 1996. 70% of the whole suicide bombings 
of the organization were carried out by the female militants137. The tribal (ashiret in 
Turkish) nature of the social structure in the region and its consequences (low education 
rates, early age marriages, polygamy, and honor killings) make the young female 
population very susceptible to ideological exploitation. The socialist ideology, which 
allegedly denies any dominant factor in the society including masculine dominancy, is 
used as an ideological message to attract this vulnerable group of people of the region. 
Almost every website in the dataset contains a part dedicated to women and the content 
of these pages is very fanatically feminist to a degree that one can conclude from these 
sites that PKK is a violent feminist organization. The Iranian branch of the PKK or PJAK 
is published only in Farsi and has no out links although it has three in links--one  from the 
youth branch’s web site, one is from PKK’s own web site and one from the European 
branch’s website. 
Almost every page emphasizes that the PKK terrorist network will not accept any 
solution to the so-called Kurdish issue without their ringleader Abdullah Ocalan. Letters, 
written by the militants, praise him to a degree that one gets the impression that he is 
supernatural. His writings reinforce this supernaturalism too. He defines his capture as 
crucifixion, and claims that the alternative ideology that he brings--he names it 
Ecological Democratic Confederation--is superior to that of Durkheim, Marx and Lenin. 
Moreover he makes an analogy between his so-called universal struggle and that of a god 
from Greek mythology--Prometheus who took fire from the hearth of the gods by stealth 
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and brought it to men, thus mankind was warm.138 This situation was observed by Clara 
Beyler who comments on the female suicide bombings of PKK: “The incentive and 
justification for suicide attacks were all based on Ocalan’s orders. The leader had such 
power and influence on the group’s members, that they did not need the pretext of 
religion, for Ocalan himself reached the status of God in the terrorist network. It was on 
this god-like leader’s orders that suicide bombings started. It was also on his command 
that they stopped.”139  The struggle of PKK seems to transform into a struggle for saving 
Abdullah Ocalan’s skin rather than allegedly pursuing Kurdish rights.   
A great majority of the web sites have multimedia content like videos, flash 
animations, audio, and colorful views. Some sites gives links to the popular new trends 
like Kurdish protest rock music, Kurdish hip hop and issues interviews with the popular 
bands and singers to attract the youth.  
One of the web sites of the network secured with password, named “cmg-
team.com” is dedicated to the cyber warfare and encourages the members to learn 
hacking techniques and provides information about the vulnerabilities of the computer 
operating systems, basic knowledge about hacking, computer security, and basic 
computer programming languages. 
The website “zaningeh.yxk-online.com” serves as an intellectual base from which 
the organization issues its strategic assessments about the future of their cause. The 
website contains assessments of terrorist organizations (especially ETA and IRA), and 
derives lessons learned from struggle against their governments. 
The critical information or what the site administrators think that it is critical 
information are not discussed nor allowed to appear in open channels. The message 
postings are not done instantly. First, messages are evaluated by the site administrators, 
and then those that are approved are posted on the site. When this author began his 
research and monitoring these sites, “sehid.com” in which the organization posts the 
killed terrorist biographies (almost updated) did not exist. Some users were asking 
questions about the situations of active members (generally if they are alive or not), 
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especially after the clashes between security forces and PKK. This reveals that some of 
these sites are administered from the main camps of PKK. In these situations, site 
administrators warned the users that they must be aware that these sites are monitored by 
the Turkish Intelligence, and the administrators directed their users to instant messaging 
tools like msn messenger to communicate privately. 
Some of the websites in the network are shut down by the court warrants due to 
their terrorist content or access to these sites are denied to the users in Turkey. In this 
situation, the other websites that are still active give instructions about how to view these 
sites by changing their proxy server and LAN settings or giving direct links to the mirror 
web pages of banned sites.   
Content analyses reveal that PKK terrorist network uses the Internet for 
communicating with its target audience, be it government, its support base or 
international community. Although this author did not find any operational training 
material in these sites, they carry out a massive motivational training through the content.  
D. NETWORK ANALYSIS OF PKK WEBSITES 
1. Why Social Network Analysis 
The Internet has become the main training environment as a result of counter 
terrorism efforts to destroy the land-based training camps. For further success, it is 
essential that the web presence of the terrorist networks be eliminated. The elimination 
strategy must be performed in a systematic way in order to prevent waste of time and 
workforce. Social network analyses can be utilized to identify which websites are 
essential for eliminating as a way to disrupt the whole network. 
Network data are defined by actors and by relations (or "nodes" and "links"). 
Network analysis focuses on the relations among actors, and not individual actors and 
their attributes. This means that the actors are usually not sampled independently, as in 
many other kinds of studies (most typically, surveys). Often network data sets describe 
the nodes and relations among nodes for a single bounded population. PKK websites are 
the study’s bounded population. The websites are the nodes and the hyperlinks between 
the websites are the links in our study. Because we analyzed the attributes of the nodes in 
content analyses, our focus in network analyses will be the relations among these 
websites. 
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Social network analysts use two kinds of tools from mathematics to represent 
information about patterns of ties among social actors: graphs and matrices. Network 
analysis uses (primarily) one kind of graphic display that consists of points (or nodes) to 
represent actors and lines (or links) to represent ties or relations. There are a number of 
software tools that are available for drawing graphs, and each has certain strengths and 
limitations. The author used UCINET and NetDraw version 4.14 to draw the map of the 
PKK websites. 
Graphs are very useful ways of presenting information about social networks. 
However, when there are many actors and/or many kinds of relations, they can become so 
visually complicated that it is very difficult to see patterns. It is also possible to represent 
information about social networks in the form of matrices. Representing the information 
in this way also allows the application of mathematical and computer tools to summarize 
and find patterns. The UCINET provides these matrices and statistical analyses tools. 
Statistical analyses are used with the graphs, for better understanding of the PKK website 
network. 
2. Methodology 
The first step of the study is constructing the dataset of the web sites. Beginning 
with the organizations designated web site (pkk.org), the author traced the hyperlinks that 
directed the users to other websites. The same procedure was followed for the each site. 
Thirty Seven different websites were identified that have links to “pkk.org.” Some 
impartial links like mainstream media organizations like CNN, AFP or REUTERS or 
international organizations like Human Rights Watch or amnesty international were not 
included in the dataset. 
The number of hits the web sites took daily basis are not included in the analysis 
because generally sympathizers artificially increase hit numbers by browsing the same 
sites multiple times. Although the official web page of Kongra-Gel--the same 
organization but with different name--has a lot of links from the other sites, the link is 
broken and the page is not currently being published. The same pages that are published 
with different names are not included in the dataset. From a basic search on a major 
search engine, one can find hundreds of personal web pages that are sympathetic to PKK 
and its cause. These pages also are not included in the dataset. Individual sympathizers 
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also use common video sharing sites like You Tube to post the propaganda videos. These 
sites have search option with key words. The PKK propaganda videos usually contains 
key words like ‘gerilla’, ‘pkk’,  ‘Ocalan’, and some popular Kurdish words to attract the 
sympathizers and misinform the web surfers who have nothing to the with the terrorist 
network’s cause. 
The second step is the visual and statistical social network analyses of PKK 
linked web pages using network analyses metrics. Instead of analyzing the network 
according to all the metrics, centrality, density and connectivity degrees are analyzed to 
identify influential websites and to overview the whole network.  The Ucinet® software 
and analyses tools are used to map the network. 
 
3. Centrality Analyses 
 
 





The first visual graph of PKK website network is obtained using MDS. MDS is a 
family of techniques used (in social network analysis) to assign locations to nodes in 
multi-dimensional space (in the case of the drawing, a 2-dimensional space) such that 
nodes that are "more similar" are closer together.140 This similarity is based on the 
number of ties or connections that the nodes have. The Web Sites located in the center 
are also the influential sites in the network. If an actor receives many ties, they are often 
said to be prominent, or to have high prestige. That is, many other actors seek to direct 
ties to them, and this may indicate their importance. Actors who have unusually high out-
degree are actors who are able to exchange with many others, or make many others aware 
of their views. Actors who display high out-degree centrality are often said to be 
influential actors. “Freeman Centrality Measures” reveals this situation statistically and 
gives the influential web sites in descending order.  
 
  1 2 3 4 
  OutDegree InDegree NrmOutDeg NrmInDeg 
1 rojaciwan.com 18 10 50 27.778 
33 hernepes.com 18 2 50 5.556 
18 dozame.org 17 6 47.222 16.667 
11 rojame.com 17 4 47.222 11.111 
30 kurdlander.com 13 0 36.111 0 
4 pajk-online.com 13 9 36.111 25 
6 kurdishinfo.com 13 10 36.111 27.778 
20 urmiye.org 12 1 33.333 2.778 
25 gerilla-online.net 11 1 30.556 2.778 
24 emkine.dk 10 3 27.778 8.333 
35 rastibini.blogspot.com 7 1 19.444 2.778 
9 zaningeh.yxk-online.com 6 10 16.667 27.778 
12 amigra.org 6 1 16.667 2.778 
3 hpg-online.com 6 10 16.667 27.778 
2 pkk.org 6 10 16.667 27.778 
27 kon-kurd.org 4 2 11.111 5.556 
31 freedom-for-ocalan.com 3 2 8.333 5.556 
28 kurder.dk 1 1 2.778 2.778 
7 gundemimiz.com 1 10 2.778 27.778 
5 kongra-gel.com 0 10 0 27.778 
8 cewlik.net 0 1 0 2.778 
14 roj.tv 0 10 0 27.778 
19 yeniozgurpolitica.com 0 7 0 19.444 
                                                 
140 Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle, “Introduction to Social Network Methods ( Riverside, 
CA:  University of California,2005), available at  http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/ accessed on 12 
November 2006 
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22 serxwebun.org 0 7 0 19.444 
16 firatnews.com 0 10 0 27.778 
26 sehid.com 0 2 0 5.556 
23 pjak.com 0 4 0 11.111 
10 abdullah-ocalan.com 0 6 0 16.667 
29 welatparez.com 0 1 0 2.778 
21 diclehaber.com 0 7 0 19.444 
13 denge-mezopotamya.com 0 4 0 11.111 
32 flash-bulletin.de 0 3 0 8.333 
15 azadiyawelat.com 0 10 0 27.778 
34 cmg-team.com 0 1 0 2.778 
17 rojev.com 0 3 0 8.333 
36 nadir.org 0 1 0 2.778 
37 ciwanenazad.rojaciwan.com 0 2 0 5.556 
Table 3 Freeman Centrality Measures of the PKK Website Network 
 
The websites located on the top of the table are more influential websites as they 
have more in and out links. This can be observed from the visual graph of the network. 




Figure 8 Principal Components Graph of the PKK Website Network 
 
 
Centrality of the websites is important because it identifies the influential 
websites in the network. In addition, identifying influential websites will give us data to 
predict the future structure of the larger network. Even our small sample demonstrates the 
principals of “scale free networks.” In “scale free networks” although most actors have 
only a few links to others, a handful of actors (hubs) have enormous amounts of 
connections.141  The prospected new websites (nodes) are going to create a link to these 
influential networks to increase their popularity and people will exercise and reinforce 
bias toward the old influential nodes by observing the increasing incoming links to these 
sites. Albert Laszlo Barabasi and Eric Bonabeau explain this tendency: “as new nodes 
appear, they tend to connect to the more connected sites, and these popular locations thus 
                                                 
141 Albert Laszlo Barabasi and Eric Bonabeau, “Scale Free Networks” Scientific American, May 2003 
p. 64 
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acquire more links over time their less connected neighbors. This “rich gets richer” 
process will generally favor the early nodes, which are more likely to eventually become 
hubs.”142  
Reliance on the certain hubs in the network seems to be an advantage for PKK to 
disseminate its propaganda quickly by means of controlled popular hubs, but also it is 
terrorist network’s vulnerability. Taking out these hubs will make rest of the network 
individual islands that have no connection to the others. The question in terms of counter 
terrorism agencies is how many of these hubs have to be taken down to crash the whole 
network. The recent research suggests that, generally speaking, the simultaneous 
elimination of as few as 5 to 15 percent of all hubs can crash the subsystem eventually 
the whole terrorist system.143 
4. Density and Geodesic Distances Analyses 
The density measures of the network are somewhat loose. The density ratios are 
as follows:  
Density (matrix average) = 0.1366 
Standard deviation = 0.3435 
These values mean that the network has only 13% of the all possible ties. This 
stems from a deliberate strategy of PKK. Some web pages, especially newspapers and the 
web page of its television channel and news agencies of the organization, do not have any 
outer connections to the other main sites of the organization. This situation creates an 
impression that newspapers and the news agencies that disseminate news to the world are 
impartial, because, simply, they do not have any links to PKK sites. 
The geodesic metrics are useful for describing the minimum distance between 
actors in the network. The web page network of PKK has maximum value of 4 in terms 
of geodesic distances; any content published in one of the sites can be reached only 
maximum four clicks on the hyperlinks. This suggests that information may travel pretty 
quickly in this network. 
 
 
                                                 
142  Barabasi and  Bonabeau, p.65 
143 Ibid. p.66 
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5. Connectivity Analyses 
Point Connectivity calculates the number of nodes that would have to be removed 
in order for one actor to no longer be able to reach another.  If there are many different 
pathways that connect two actors, they have high "connectivity" in the sense that there 
are multiple ways for a signal to reach from one to the other. The website network of 
PKK is very robust in terms of point connectivity. The most influential sites have higher 
point connectivity which makes it difficult to deny internet users to reach these influential 
sites. The sites that have the highest connectivity are rojaciwan.com (10), rojame.com 
(10), dozame.org (10), gerilla-online.net (10), hernepes.com (10), urmiye.org (10), and 
pajk.com (9) respectively. 
 
Figure 9 Circular Layout Graph of the PKK Website Network 
 
The circular layout graph is a good illustration of networks closed nature in 
systems terms. This can be observed from the centrality- degree values of the network. 
The network has 18 zero out-degree values as opposed to only one zero in in-degree 
values which is the indicator of closed nature of the network to its environment. Only one 
website, “flash-bulletin.de” has a links to the outer world that has different view other 
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than that of the organization. This web site has links to the mainstream news media like 
CNN and AFP. When you enter the network the links directs you to the news that PKK 
wants you to read, the music that PKK wants you to listen, the images that PKK wants 
you to view. The only different point of view comes from welatparez.com which has the 
same cause, that is, to build a free Kurdistan including Turkish territory publishing from 
Denmark, but criticizes the internal affairs of the organization. The propaganda made in 
the network of the websites of the PKK is enough to demonize Turkey and the Turks and 
to create sense of us versus them on the ethnic nationalist basis. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The content and the network analyses of the PKK linked websites is a good 
illustration of how modern terrorist systems use technology to their own benefit. 
According to Gabriel Weimann there were 4,300 terrorist websites on the Net in 2005 
and probably more than that today144. They use the Net basically as a communication 
tool among other various purposes. The Internet is not only a platform for the likeminded 
terrorists to meet and communicate, but also a weapon to attack basic information 
structures of their superior enemies on the Net. 
The Website network of PKK is designed in such a way that when a neutral 
internet surfer enters the network, he or she is indoctrinated according to PKK’s ideology 
and looks at the world from the terrorists’ perspective. The network is robust in terms of 
inter-connectivity but vulnerable to coordinated attacks as are all the “small world” 
networks.145 In order to disrupt the whole network of terrorist websites the most 
influential sites (hubs) that almost all the information radiates from must be given 
priority. Eliminating these hubs will leave the other nodes as individual islands which are 
not so influential. 
The loosely controlled nature of Net provides new opportunities for terrorist 
organizations. The differences between countries about defining terrorism make the 
situation more complicated to act in concert against terrorism. Terrorist organizations, no 
matter what their ideological bases, are exploiting this situation and using Net as new 
safe haven for their various activities. 
                                                 
144 Gabriel Weimann, p. 5  
145Barabasi and  Bonabeau, p.65  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. KEY POINTS 
The study began by using a system’s approach to define the overall system of 
terrorism. It then focused on the training subsystem as a critical point of intervention for 
interdiction. The training subsystem is considered to be the most important component of 
the terrorist systems for various reasons: 
• The training subsystem is the main energy provider to the terrorist system 
through its recruitment component. 
• Training subsystem is the facilitator of the competency in the whole system at 
individual and systems levels by acquiring the strategic knowledge, 
distributing it through the system and enabling the system learn to adapt to its 
hostile environment. 
• Training subsystem includes the ideology (mainly what is thought in training) 
which operates as a regulator (cybernetics) through feedback mechanisms. 
The counter terrorism strategies of most countries today are focused on killing, 
capturing or deterring terrorism. The success of this type of approach is measured in the 
numbers of dead bodies of terrorists, the number of prisoners in detainee centers or the 
number of terrorist plots prevented. However, the yardstick for evaluating a counter 
terrorism strategy should be the difference the strategy makes between the number of 
current and prospected terrorists. If the grand strategy decreases the number of future 
terrorists, than it could be said to be effective. The ideal would be to prevent the number 
of terrorists from increasing. Disrupting the training subsystem is one of the proactive 
strategies to counter the terrorism by stopping or eliminating the terrorist recruiting 
system. 
As discussed throughout the study, organizations try to keep their recruitment 
channels open by means of intensive motivational training. First they create the sense of 
“us versus them” through motivational training, and then try to harm “them” by violence 
through operational training. According to Jerrold Post, “terrorism at heart is a vicious  
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species of psychological warfare, it is violence as communication. Smart bombs and 
missiles will not win this war. The only way to counter psychological warfare is with 
psychological warfare.”146  
Smart bombs and missiles are also necessary but not adequate for fighting 
terrorist systems. Coercive instruments are the only means that governments have for 
making terrorism costly. Tracing, finding and eliminating geographical terrorist training 
camps are necessary, but this elimination strategy should not stop there. It should include 
wiping out the web presence of the terrorist systems, because they have moved their 
geographical training camps to the information highway where they enjoy the anonymity 
that the Internet provides. 
Social network analyses techniques can be used to map the Internet-based 
infrastructure of terrorist systems. Social network analysis helps to identify the central 
sites of terrorist networks. Influential websites should have the first priority in an 
elimination strategy, because the other sites simply imitate or use these influential 
websites as their main source. This does not necessarily require an extensive censorship 
that would create more problems than it solves. A selective elimination strategy that 
would include the internet users who are interested in the terrorism should be tried. 
Community policing the internet would enhance the sense of ownership among the 
responsible internet users. There are some hacker groups who do it now, as individuals. 
But to be effective these efforts must be coordinated. There has to be a central site where 
people can go to inform about terrorist content and an implementation group that has the 
technical expertise to disrupt such systems. 
The website network of the terrorist organization PKK is analyzed as a case study 
and its influential websites are identified using social network analyses tools. The case 
study demonstrates how a modern terrorist system uses the internet for motivational 
training of its current and prospected militants and how its presence could be reduced 
even eliminated using social network analyses. In this case study, there were three steps 
in the elimination strategy. The first step was to collect data for constructing a dataset of 
the terrorist websites—and suggested that community policing the internet can enhance 
the effectiveness of this step. The second step was to map them to determine  the overall                                                  
146 Jerold Post, “Psychological Operations: A Critical Weapon in Countering Terrorism” cited in 
Gabriel Weimann, 2006, Terror on the Internet, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press)  
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network structure. The third step was to identify the key websites that could be 
eliminated. The next steps would be to disrupt these website networks or deny internet 
users to be able to reach these sites.  The future steps in the elimination strategy have 
technical, social, and political aspects, all of which are different research topics. However 
it is obvious that we need international collaboration. Terrorist networks publish their 
websites from almost every country that has web hosting providers. Terrorist networks 
can move their sites if they are banned in one country. To be effective, the elimination 
strategy needs to be comprehensive.  
B.  SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Continue to eliminate the geographical terrorist training camps.  
2. Use social network analysis to identify and eliminate the virtual training 
camps in a systematic way. 
3. Clear internet of hatred fuelling content. 
4. Be aware of the potential use of peer-to-peer internet networks for terrorist 
purposes and prepare to counter it. 
5. Invite the public to participate in the elimination process, and encourage 
community policing among the internet users. 
6. Focus on countering the terrorist doctrine instead of struggling with the 
indoctrinated terrorists. 
7. Foster international cooperation against motivational and operational 
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